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Hungary stands to gain considerably from an improvement in its
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Recenit  po  litical changes in Eastern Europe are leading  EFTA membership would have distinct advantages
to clos,.r economic relations between its countries and  because the EC/EFTA Protocol allows for virtually
the EC.  Hungary has been granted GSP status by the  free trade in manufactures between the two blocs.
EC and, with some important exceptions, quantitative  Barring EC or EFTA membership, some form of
restrictions on its exports to the EC will be progres-  association might yet be broached - along the lines
sivelv eliminated.  of the EC's  special relationship with Turkey, Yugo-
slavia, and other Mediterranean CoLuntries.
Further improvement of Hungary's access to the
EC market faces three main challenges:  the full  Tovias and Laird examined the potential trade
integration of Spain and Portugal in the EC, unifica-  effects of such different relationships between the EC
tionr  of Gernmany,  and completion of the EC's internal  and Hungary, including in the context of possible
market in 1992.  The inclusion of Spain and Portugal  outcomes of the Uruguay Round.  Their simulations
in the EC is likely to stiffen the competition for  confirm the importance of an exporter's  place in the
IlLlgairy's  exports to the EC.  After German unifica-  EC's pyramid of privileges.  Membership in the EC
tion, the fornmer  GDR -an  important market for  could lead to an expansion of Hungary's exports to
Ilungary - will apply EC measures, and its goods  the EC of some 48 percent, with meats, iron and steel,
'Aill  Compete  with Hungary's exports on more  fruit and vegetables, textiles, and clothing being the
.i\ orable termis  in the rest ol the EC.  Under EC-92  main sectors to gain, in declining order. This results
the reduction of internal barriers will likely cause  from setting tariffs at zero and eliminating non-tariff
dik  ersion of trade to other EC suppliers away from  barriers.  Membership in the EFTA would lead to
nTin-EC  suppliers, by 5-7 percent on average accord-  only a t5 percent expansion of exports to the EC, and
in"  to LtIC  EC's calculations.  New regulations and  obtaining the same preferential uariff  treaunent as the
norms will have both positive and negative aspects for  NMediterranean  countries would lead to a  10 percent
I  luhnioarv.  increase.  GSP treatment is projected to exparnd
exports by 6 percent.  The authors superimposed their
'Ihe continuing economic problems of Eastern  Uruguay Round scenarios on these prefereintial
lurope.  including the Soviet Union, suggest that  positions and found that the export gains from EC
I lungary has little +eniative  but to seek even closer  membership are reduced to 43 percent - as EC
ties A ith the EC.  But H3ungary  faces important supply  barriers are reduced for all countries.  EFTA member-
constrainits  and will need an infusion of new technol-  ship and the same treatment as other Mediterranean
ogy and physical capiLal  to take advantage of its  and GSP countr  ies are somewhat better for Hungary
position on the doorstep of the EC.  Hungary has been  than non-Uruguay Round scenarios, because under
cxamining  the options of applying for EC member-  these scenarios the authors allow for some reduction
ship.  It has also considered applying for European  in non-tariff barriers in agriculture and in the textile
Free Trade Association (EFTA) membership - and cloLhing  sectors, which more than offsets the
possibly as an interim step toward EC membership-  relative decline in preferential tariff treatment.  Only
but Lhis  seems unlikely to be accepted by the EC, and  minor losses to Spain and Portugal would result from
obtaining EFTA membership would not be easy.  improved access to the EC for Hungary.
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The development of the European Communities (EC) over more than 30 years
from a Customs Union of six countries to a Common Market of 12 countries for
goods,  services and production  factors is bound to  affect countries on  its
periphery  more  intensively  than  others.  Hungary  is  in  such  a  position.
Moreover, the influence  of the  EC on  Hungary's  economy  will soon  increase,  partly
because of the chax,ges  which have taken place in Central Europe in the last two
years, particularly in  Hungary itself.  The democratization of Hungary is being
accompanied by economic reform, including a progressive liberalization of the
foreign trade  and currency regime, the  promotion and protectior.  of  foreign
private  direct  investment,  and a  reconsideration  of  the  Council  of Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA).
The EC affects Hungary's economy both directly and indirectly.  In the
first  category is  the non-preferential  trade  and cooperation  agreement concluded
between the two parties in  September 1988.  This has heen partially superseded
recently by several  ad hoc measures in the form of u...lateral  EC concessions --
the inclusion of Hungary among  GSP recipients, the elimination or suspension  of
QRs on Hungary's exports, and the expansion of textile quotas.  In  the financial
realm, the  EC  is both  the  Chairman of  a Consultative  Group  for  emergency
assistance  to  Hungary and  Poland, contributing  this fiscal  year a  300  million ECU
grant for both countries and a US$1 billion medium-term structural adjustment
loan for Hungary.  Indirectly,  there are several processes by which the EC will
affect Hungary:
o  The Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, scheduled to be
completed in December 1990;
o  The  incorporation  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  into  the
European Communities through German unification;
o  The completion of the EC's internal market on December 31 1992; and
o  The  renewal,  revision  or  establishment  of  trade  schemes  with
different groups of countries (EFTA,  Eastern Europe, Mediterranean
countries, GSP and Gulf Cooperation Council).
The first three sub-regions are being singled out by the EC for further
privileged treatment through what is called "proximity policy.",
The tentative  and changing nature of the EC-Hungarian  relationship is
apparent.  What  is also apparent is that EC relations with other groups of
countries are also changing, and these changes will soon affect EC-Hungarian
relations.  While the present report will soon  become outdated, it may be useful
at  a time  the  Hungarian government must  think  through the  implications of
different events: those over which it does not have any control and those for
which different policy options are open to them.
II.  The EC and Hungary As Trade Partners
The economic importance of the EC-12 is impressive when compared to the
USSR or the US, as shown in  Table 1.  In 1987  the combined GNP of the EC-12 was
almost as  large as that of the US  and larger than that of the USSR.  The
population c  the  Communities, however, is larger  than  that of  the  USSR or of the
The authors express  their appreciation  to Monique Skruzny for some  of the
statistical  work, and  to  Andras Inotai,  Bela  Balassa,  Ron Duncan,  Paul  Meo, David
Tarr, Chandrashekar Pant and  Oli Havrylyshyn for  comments  on an  earlier version.
Aoence Europe, October 21, 1989.2
US  --  a fact  which  may be more sigiiificant  in  assessing absorption  capacities for
food or other primary commodities than income.  In spite of some newer, poorer
members, the average per capita  GNP of the EC-12 is  one and a  half times that of
the USSR.  This may even be understated in  terms of living standards, since  much
of the Soviet GNP reflects defense expenditure.
The EC is also the largest trading economy in the world, accounting for
more than a third of world trade.  About half of all world trade takes place in
Western Europe and its immediate  periphery. 2 Even  when excluding from  the figures
intra-EC trade, the EC's external trade alone almost equalled the trade of the
US and Japan combined.  The EC has great bargaining power in trade negotiations,
and its clout in the OECD is overwhelming, since half of OECD membership is
constituted by EC countries.
Finally, the EC's development assistance effort is substantially larger
than that of the US or the USSR.  The share of the EC-12 in world ODA (average
1986/87) was over 35%, compared to the US's 20% and the USSR's 10%.
As Hungary  breaks its  tight institutional  links  with  the CMEA.  the EC could
soon become the most important export outlet for Hungarian goods and services,
given:
1)  the limited possibilities that Hungary has to expand exports to its
neighbors, also undergoing structural reforms;
2)  the  economic  propinquity  to  the  EC  (compared to  other  sizeable
markets), coupled with its huge purchasing capacity;
3) the  incorporation into a  united Germany  of the  GDR,  an  important
trading partner of Hungary;
4) the  widely diffused  knowledge of  three Western  European  languages
(German, French and English).
Table 1:  Some Comparative Statistics for 1987
EC-12  US  USSR
Area (000/sa.km.)  2,254.7  9,372.7  22.402.2
Population (mil.)  323.8  243.8  283.1
GNP,SBn  4,282.0  4,526.7  2500'
GNP/per capita (USS)  13,225.4  18,567.3  8,658.2
Exports  391.72  243.7  107.6
Imports  397.22  422.4  95.9
ODA, US$Bn.  19.13  8.9  4.2'
ODA/GDP %  0.45  0.20  0.17'
Source:  WDR 1989; COMTRADE; National Accounts; OECD.
1988, as estimated by the CIA
2  excluding intra-EC trade
3  ODA data for Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain not available.
While changes for the better or for the worse in any of these factors
cannot  be foreseen,  there are  other factors  which with  time will further  increase
the relative importance  of the EC. One is  a further  broadening of the EC-Hungary
2  Narjes (1984),  p. 215.3
trade ag~.eement  and/or further  unilateral EC trade concessions.  Another is the
possible  expansLon of the Er to  include  Au3tria, another important  trade partner
of Hu.gary.
A.  The Present EC-Hungary trad n_  pattern
In the recent past the USSR has been by far Hungary's main export outlet
and took as much as one third of its exports in 1985.  In the early 1980's
Hungary had  been exporting more  heavily to  the EC, particularly  low-priced
agricultural goods, but in the mid-1980s there was some re-direction of trade
toward the USSR for  hard currency and  oil.  This also coincided with an economic
downturn in the EC.  However, in the second half of the 1980s, the pattern has
begun to change with the EC-12 becoming an increasingly important market for a
wide range of Hungarian exports. 3 As TabLe 2 indicates the EC-12's share of
Hungarian exports had grown to 22.7 per cent in 1988 while the Soviet share had
declined to 27.6 percent (following  a 4 6 percent  decline in  the $  value of this
trade). 4 Preliminary  data  for  198S  and  the  first  half  of  1990 show  the
continuation of these trends, and they are expected to continue --  for reasons
discussed in succeeding sections of this paper. 5
Table 2.  Geographical Distribution of Hungary's Merchandise Exports - 1980, 1985,
1988.
Partner  1980  1985  1988
Sm  %  Sm  Sm  %
World  8,667  100.0  8,555  100.0  °,931  100.0
Austria  378  4.4  460  5.4  568  5.7
EC 12  1,810  20.9  1,373  16.0  2,250  22.7
Germany,F.R.  590  6.8  520  6.1  525  5.3
USA  113  1.3  198  2.3  293  3.0
USSR  2,540  29.3  2,876  33.6  2,742  27.6
Source:  COMTRA-DE
3  The Yearbook of the Hungarian Statistical  Office shows  that the share of
the  EC-12  in  1988 exports  increased to  24%.  On  the  other  hand,  Hungary
represents less than 1% of EC's imports.  It is  also worthwhile noting that the
relative importance of trade with the EC is almost twice as large  as the average
of the other CMEA couintries.
4  Although 45.5% was still exported to CMEA countries in 1988,  only 41.2%
of total exports was settled in transferable rubles.  According to Hungarian
sources,  the share of CMEA is  expected to go down to 40% in 1990, something very
significant in historical perspective, given that it was more than 70% in 1960.
5  Exports to the*  EC increased by 33.7% in value terms in the first six
months of 1989.  Eve.a  discounting the effect of inflation which on an annual
basis was not above 20%, this makes for a very substantial volume increase, at
a time when exports to the USSR tended to stagnate if not decline in absolute
terms.  See EIU nr.4 1989.4
Az general background on Hungary's trade, Table 3 gives a broad breakdown
of the commcdity composition of its merchandise exports to the world and the EC
in 1983 and .987.  This shows the relative importance of machinery (electrical
and non-electrical),  food products  (especially live animals, meat  and  meat
preparations and fruits and vege'.ables),  basic manufactures (mainly  basic iron
and steel products aa  well as texziles), miscellaneous manufactures (especially
clothing ar.d  furniture) and chemicals, in that order.  There were no dramatic
shifts in the composition of Hungary's exports to the World  in this period.
However, the table shows that the increase in the EC-12's share of Hungarian
exports was  not evenly spread. Among the large  trade items  --  basic manufacturas
and  machinery, where exports to the  world also  grew much faster --  more were re-
directed to the EC-12 than on average.  Also, while this re-orientation of
exports in the food and miscellaneous manuafactures  sector was less strong than
the average  --  probably due to the restraining influence  of the CAP and the EC's
textiles regime, respectively --  there was still a strong re-direction of trade
towards the EC-12 in these traditional Hungarian export sectors.l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Table  3.  Hungarian  Exports  to  the  World  and  the  EC-12,  1983,  1987.
Product  1983  1987
World  EC12  World  EC12
Sm  Share  in  $m  Share  of  Sm  Share  in  $m  Share  of
Total  %  Exports  Total  %  Exports
to  World  to  World
Total  8,722  100.01  3,384  15.9  9,571  100.0  1,912  20.0
0  Food  &  Live  Animals  1,636  18.8  421  25.7  1,529  16.0  476  31.2
1  Beverages  &  Tobacco  216  2.5  16  7.4  151  1.6  17  11.4
2  Crude  Matla  Excl  Fuels  349  4.0  110  31.7  411  4.3  153  37.1
3  Mineral  Fuels  Etc  806  9.2  47  5.8  402  4.2  69  17.2
4  Animal,  Veg.  Oil,  Fat  105  1.2  13  12.4  80  0.8  9  11.0
5  Chemicals  883  10.1  203  23.0  1,112  11.6  262  23.5
6  Basic  Manufactures  1,090  12.5  216  19.8  1,311  13.7  351  26.8
7  Machines,Transp.Equip.  2,650  30.4  151  5.7  3,249  33.9  243  31.6
8  Misc  Manuf  Goods  839  9.8  183  21.3  1,152  12.0  292  25.4
9  Goods  Not  Classfd
By  Kind  127  1.5  24  18.8  175  1.8  40  23.0
',urce:  COMTRADE
Note:  Percentage  calculations  and  totals  are  based  on  more  detailed  data  which  are  rounded  off  in this  tab:e.6
Taking further the comparison of the composition of Hungary'. exports to
the EC-12 with Hungary's exports to the world for 1987 (Table  4), there are some
triking differences.  For example, only 16 percent of Hungary's exports to the
sorld are food items whereas nearly 25 percent oZ its exporta to the EC-12 are
food items.  Again, among the large trade items  there is a  much higher shar-  of
basic  manufactures (SITC  6)  and  miscellaneous  manufactures (SITC  8) in Hungary's
exports to  the EC-12 than to the  world.  However,  when it  comes to  n-chinery and
transport equipment (SITC  7), these  make up 33.9  percent of Hungary'.J  export. to
the world but only 12.7  percent of its  exports *o  the EC-12.  This appears to be
related to the inclusion in  world exports of  transport equipment (buses)  which
are  exported to the USSR. These products  are relatively  uncompetitive in  the EC.
Certainly, tariff rates seem high against  Hungary in  this sector but other trade
barriers that Hungary faces in the EC-12 are not discriminatory against Hungary
in this sector.  On the contrary, NTB's have been Hspecially aimed at Japanese
autos.  Moreover, as we shall see in Section IV there is greater protection in
other  large export  sectors.  However,  it  .s notable that  almost  half of
Hungary's exports to the USSR are machinery and transport equipment --  mostly
buses.  (Indeed  mcre than 80 per cent of Hungary's exports of buses are to other
CMEA countries).  Thus, Hungary's  world figures  were  somewhat distorted by the
special  trade arrangements within the CMEA and its remains to be seen how these
will now change.
Table 4.  Commodity composition of Hungary's exports  to the world and  the EC-12,
1987.
Difference as %
Product  world  EC-12  of world Share
Total Export (Sm)  9571  1912
Share in total (percent)  100.0  100.0
0  16.0  24.9  +55.6
1  1.6  0.8  -50.0
2  4.3  8.0  +86.0
3  4.2  3.6  -14.2
4  0.8  0.4  -50.0
5  11.6  13.7  +18.1
6  13.7  18.4  +34.3
7  33.9  12.7  -62.5
8  12.0  15.3  +27.5
9  1.8  2.1  +16.6
Source:  COMTRADE7
B.  ExDorts  of  pervices:  tourism
The  World  Tourism  Organization  comp.les  national  statistics  reported  by
some  of  its  membcrs,  including  Hungary.  Although  the  data  available  are
incomplnte,  they  show  (Table 5) that a third of the hotel  nights  spent by fnreign
tourists  originate  in five  out  of  the  twelve  EC  countries  for which  there  are
data.  The  EC-12,  therefore,  probably  has  a  much  larger  weight  in Hungary's
exports  of tourism  than of goods,  comparable  to the total  CMEA  and double  as much
as the  USSR.  Moreover,  the EC tourists  brought  convertible  currency  with  theml
thus  their  relative  effect  on  Hungary's  balance  of  payments  was  likely  much
larger  than  the  hotel  nights  demonstrate.
Table  5: Foreign  Tourists  Nigihts Spent  in Hotels
(number  of nights)
Countries  1985  1986  1987
France  81,000  84,000  92,000
German  Federal  Republic  1,406,000  1,223,000  1,481,000
Italy  157,000  217,ono  307,000
Netherlands  94,000  89,000  12F,000
United  Kingdom  77,000  85,000  87,000
EC-5  1,815,000  1,698,000  2,095,000
Bulgaria  90,000  97,000  123,000
Czechoslovakia  220,000  255,000  260,000
German  Democratic  Rep.  237,000  24C,000  220,000
Poland  529,000  537.000  450,000
Romania  50,000  27,000  23,000
Soviet  Union  881,000  928,000  1,216,000
CMEA  2,007,000  2,084,000  2,292,000
world  5,343,000  5,384,000  6,392,000
Source:  Yearbook  of Tourism  Statistics,  Table  5, 1987  and  1988.
The  higher  share  of the  EC  in Hungary's  tourism  may  be  explained  by the
facts  that:  1) trade  in tourism  services  is much  less  distorted  than  trade  in
goods;  2) the CMEA  arrangements  have  little bearing  on  tourism;  3) tourism  demand
is  directly  related  to  income  in  the  originating  countries  and  to  relative
transport  costs.  Since the latter  is roughly  similar,  the different  income  levels
in the two blocs  probably  explains  the present  flows more  than  any other  factor.
It seems  likely  that  in the  future  the ECs  share  in foreign  tourist  nights  spent
in Hungary  will  increase  because  of the economic  crisis  in Eastern  Europe  and the
increasing  appeal  of Eastern  Europe  to potenti  - Western  tourists  at the end of
the  Cold  War.
C.  Imports
Turning  to imports,  Hungary's  trade  with  the EC has been  increasing  since
the relatively  low level and share of 1984 - see Table  6.  According  to HungarianB
data,  more  thai  a quarter  of  Hung,  ry'u total  imp.rts and  a  third  of  its
manufactured imports originated in the EC by lS88.6
Table 6.  Geographical Distribution of Hungary's Imporle, 1980, 1985, 1988.
1980  1984  198',
Sm  $  Sm  %  Sm
World  9,212  lC0.0  8,084  100.0  9,855  100.0
Austria  497  5.4  408  5.0  626  6.4
EC-12  2,135  23.2  1,651  20.4  2,426  24.6
Germany, F.R.  640  6.9  515  6.4  628  6.4
USA  252  2.7  199  2.5  251  2.5
USSR  2,556  27.7  2,354  29.1  2,805  28.5
Source:  COMTRADE
The  basic  structure  of  Hungary's  imports  has  not  been  changir&g
signif cantly over  time.  HungLry imports  manufactured  products from  the  EC, more
than 90%, and half its imports from the USSR are minerals and fuels (see  Annex
Tables Al and A2).
The EC is by  far t:;Fr  principal euppli  :.  of manufactu:ed products, and
incorporation  of the GDR into  the EC will only reinforce this, particularly for
machinery.  On the other hand, most Hungarian fuels imports originate in the
USSR, which ia also the prime foreign supplier of agricultural products.  A
further cra1e liberalization in Hungary and a reform or withering away of the
CMEA would probably increase  the share of non-CMEA suppliers, including that of
the EC.  There is sonte  movement in this direction.  The USSR has indicated that
wishes to reduce ite fuel  deliveries to Hurgary in  the short  run (see  later).
Table 7: Geographical Distribution of Hurgary's .mports by Main Category
of Products, 1987 (percent)
Rest of the
EC-12  USSR  GDR  AUSTRIA  USA  world
Total trade  24.6  28.5  6.4  6.4  2.5  31.7
Agriculture  15.5  25.1  1.5  3.7  3.0  51.3
Mineral  fuels  1.7  85.0  1 7  0.2  0.4  11.1
Chemicals  4.2  13.9  5.2  V.3  4.5  24.9
Machines,tra.,s.equip.  27.2  17.5  12.7  8.3  3.3  31.1
Other manuf.products  33.8  11.9  5.8  10.1  1.5  37.0
Source: COMTRADE
6  According to the Yearbook of the Hungarian Statistical office the share
of the EC12 increased moderately in 1988 to 25.3%.9
III.  Trade Policy of the EC Applied on Hunaarian Extorts
Until the concluseon  of the September 1988  Trade and  Cooperation  Agreement
between the EC and Hungary, the latter was treated as a GATT member as far an
tariffs were  concerned.  However,  the  EC has a  multiplicity  of  trade arrangements
so that,  as  far  as tariffs  are  concerned, GATT  most  favored nation  (MFN)
treatment often works out as the least favorable treatment in practice.  In
addition, non-tariff barriers (NTBs)  have been applied by the EC and its  member
states in  wavs which have discriminated against  Hungary.  Provided there  were no
serious  supply  constraints,  Hungary's  exports  to  the  EC  could  expand
substantially if it were to receive better treatment in the EC trade r6gime.
(A) Tariffs
Table  8  shows  tne  average  tariffs  applied  by  the  EC-10 (Belgium-Luxembourg,
Denmark,  the Federal Republic  of Germany, France,  Great Britain,  Greece, Ireland
Italy and the Netheilands) under the common Pxternal tariff  (CET) in 1983 on
imports  from Hungary,  OECD  countries, the  socialist  (or former  socialist)
countries  (excluding  China),  developing  countries  (including  China),
Mediterranean countries, EFTA countries and the world.  The sources of data are
discussed in  Annex II.  There have  been only  minor changes in  tariffs since 1983.
This was the mid-point of implementation of the Tokyo Round results which still
prevail, but the EC had introduced some of those tariffs ahead of schedule.
There have also been minor changes in the GSP and in the arrangements under the
Lom6 Convention.  More  importantly, the EC-12 has started to grant  improved
treatment  to  Hungary (see  later). However,  these data  give  a reasonably  accurate
picture of the situation until the most recent changes.
Several points must  be noted: first, the average rate of 6.8 percent
applied against  imports from  Hungary  was  much higher  than corresponding  rates for
the world or for other groups of countries.  This results from the fact  that the
EC has  a complex  structure  of  tariff preferences  under trade agreements  with EFTA
countries and  the Mediterranean countries, while it also accords special tariff
treatment to developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP)  and to former African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)  territories under the
Lome  Convention.  Thus, GATT MFN treatment was basically the treatment for non-
European industrial countries and the  'socialist" countries.  Apart from the
tariff preferences, Hungary exports many goods which attract relatively high
protection in  the EC marlet --  including  many labor-intensive  goods.  This high-
protection composition of trade is also why the average rate against Hungary is
more than double the average rate against uther "socialist"  countries, although
item-for-item the rates are mostly the same.10
Table  8:  EC TARIFFS APPLIED IN  1983 AGAINST  GROUPS  OF EXPORTERS  (percont)
SITC  DESCRIPTION  world  OECD SOC LDC  MED  EFTA  HUNGARY
ALL  TOTAL  TRADE  2.6  3.2  2.7  2.1  1.9  0.3  6.8
00  LIVE ANIMALS  2.2  0.6  4.6  5.6  5.4  1.8  4.8
01  MEAT  & PREPARATIONS  13.2  13.2  9.5  14.3  14.2  9.1  9.6
02  DAIRY PRODUCTS  & EGGS  10.8  11.1  3.3  1.9  12.0  11.4  12.0
03  FISH & PREPARATIONS  8.2  6.8  12.7  11.5  10.2  3.4  3.3
04  CEREALS  AND  PREPARATIONS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
05  FRUIT & VEGETABLES  8.3  7.1  13.0  9.7  5.7  16.6  14.2
06  SUGAR,  PREPARATIONS  & HONEY  25.9  27.0  26.6  25.9  15.2  26.3  27.0
07  COFFEE,  TEA, COCOA,  SPICES  2.5  1.9  2.8  2.5  3.5  8.0  11.6
08  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  1.7  0.1  0.3  2.3  0.6  1.6  0.2
09  MISC FOOD  PREPARATIONS  12.6  10.7  7.3  14.2  1.5  7.1  4.6
11  BEVERAGES  12.4  7.1  21.3  22.4  16.7  9.0  20.1
12  TOBACCO  & MANUFACTURES  THEREOF  61.8  66.1  48.7  45.5  70.0  88.2
21  HIDES,SKINS,  INC.  FUR, UNDRESSED  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
22  OIL  SEEDS,NUTS,KERNELS  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
23  RUBBER  CRUDE,SYNTHETIC  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.2
24  WOOD,  LUMBER  & CORK  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
25  PULP AND  WASTE  PAPER  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
26  TEXTILE FIBERS (NOT YARN,  THREAD)  0.6  0.6  1.6  0.6  0.1  0.0  2.6
27  CRUDE  FERTILIZERS  & MINERALS  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
28  METALLIFEROUS  ORES, METAL  SCRAP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
29  CRUDE  ANIMAL  VEG  MATERIALS  NES  3.6  3.8  0.8  2.7  7.9  1.7  0.7
32  COAL,COKE,BRIOUETTES  2.9  3.0  2.8  2.7  1.8  0.0  0.9
33  PETROLEUM  & PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.0  3.5
34  GAS  NATURAL  AND  MANUFACTURED  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  1.0
35  ELECTRIC  ENERGY  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
41  ANIMAL  OILS & FATS  0.5  0.6  2.4  0.2  0.7  0.5  2.2
42  FIXED VEGETABLE  OILS & FATS  6.7  9.9  7.4  6.5  8.4  8.8  8.9
43  PROCESD  ANIMAL, VEG  OIL  & FATS  9.2  9.3  0.7  9.5  0.1  13.8  0.5
51  CHEMICAL  ELEMENTS  & COMPOUNDS  3.3  3.2  4.1  4.0  3.6  0.2  3.0
52  MINERAL  TAR & CRUDE  CHEMICALS  0.3  0.1  0.8  0.3  0.1  0.0  1.1
53  DYEING, TANNING  & COLORING  MATRLS  2.7  2.5  8.8  3.9  3.4  0.0  10.0
54  MEDICINAL  & PHARM  PRODUCTS  2.7  2.5  5.7  5.0  3.6  0.1  6.8
55  ESSENTIAL  OILS & PERFUME  MATRLS  2.3  2.5  0.7  1.6  1.1  0.0  3.2
56  FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  2.5  2.4  3.6  4.1  3.0  0.0  7.5
57  EXPLOSIVES,  PYROTECH  PRODUCTS  3.9  3.1  5.7  5.4  2.3  0.0  8.9
58  PLASTIC MATERIALS  ETC  5.7  5.6  12.5  8.7  3.6  0.0  13.4
59  CHEMICALS  NES  3.4  3.3  5.2  4.0  0.9  0.0  6.8
61  LEATHER/FURS  INC MANUFS  2.1  1.2  3.7  2.8  3.2  0.0  5.1
62  RUBBER  MANUFACTURES  2.9  2.3  6.6  4.3  2.9  0.0  6.8
63  WOOD  & CORK  MANUFACTURES  4.1  2.8  8.3  5.9  4.2  0.0  6.4
64  PAPER/BOARD  & MANUFACTURES  2.7  2.6  8.9  6.7  6.3  1.4  10.5
65  TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS  & ARTICLES  5.3  3.2  10.1  7.6  3.0  0.1  12.0
66  NON-METALLIC  MINERAL  MANUFACTURES  2.0  2.0  4.2  1.1  0.7  0.0  8.6
67  IRON  & STEEL  2.3  1.7  5.8  3.3  3.8  0.0  6.0
68  NON-FERROUS  METALS  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.5  3.1  0.0  4.1
69  METAL  MANUFACTURES  NES  3.0  2.5  5.3  4.9  2.5  0.0  6.1
71  MACHINES  NON-ELECTRIC  3.3  3.3  5.5  3.9  2.4  0.0  5.3
72  MACHINERY  ELECTRIC  6.0  5.7  6.2  7.0  3.5  0.0  6.3
73  TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  4.7  4.8  8.9  3.4  6.0  0.0  16.9
81  SANITARY,PLUMBG,HEATNG,LGHTNG  EOU  2.2  0.9  6.8  4.7  4.3  0.0  8.5
82  FURNITURE  3.2  0.9  6.6  5.4  4.2  0.0  6.7
83  TRAVEL  GOODS,  HANDBAGS  4.9  3.3  5.1  4.3  4.2  0.0  6.1
84  CLOTHING  7.3  2.1  10.5  9.3  5.4  0.0  13.2
85  FOOTWEAR  6.5  0.7  9.6  9.1  5.9  0.0  11.7
86  PROF. SCIENTIFIC ETC INSTRUMENTS  6.1  6.2  6.9  4.4  1.5  0.0  6.9
89  MISC MANUFACTURES  NES  5.1  4.9  6.0  5.0  2.4  0.2  5.5
Source:  See Annex  11.
Note:  Missing  vaLues  impLies  no  imports  in  these  categories.
SOC  *  "Socialist"  countries  of  Asia  and Eastern  Europe  pLus the  USSR  and Cuba, excluding  China  and Hungary.
MED  - Mediterranean  countries,  not  elsewhere  included,  including  China,
LDC  Developing  countries,  not  elsewhere  included,  incLuding  China.
OECO-  OECD  countries,  including  Spain  and Portugal,  excluding  Turkey.
EFTA-  Austria,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden, Switzerland  and  IceLand.11
With respect to individual categories of prcducts, it is clear from the
table that thero are relatively high tariffs spread throughout the agricultural
sector,  as  well as in  chemicals, textiles,  transport (automobiles),  clothing and
footwear.
(B)  Non-Tariff Barriers
By all accounts the main obstacles to market access for Hungary were (and
still are) non-tariff barriers (NTBs), some of them targeted specifically at
Hungary.  In that respect, a distinction must be made between those barriers
applied by the EC a. a group and those applied by individual member states.
Table 9 gives a broad overview of the use of NTBs by the EC as a group in
1988.  A perusal of  the table  shows that the products  concerned were  both
"sensitive" in the EC and relatively competitive in Hungary.12
Table 9: Main NTBs Applied on EC Imports from Hungary, 1988
Type of NTB  Frequency  Main cat. of products
concerned
Tariff quotas  4  sheep and lambmeat
Seasonal tariffs  17  apples,cherries
Variable levies  19  sheep and porkmeat,other
animal pr.,preserved fruit
Variable component  1  extracts of coffee
Licenses  48  meat,preserved fruit and
vegetablea,maize,wine
Quotas  2  preserved vegetables
Quotas by country  4  sheepmeat
VERs  22  iron and steel products
MFA restrictive agr.  217  textiles and clothing
Retr. surveillance  1  nitr.fertilizers
Community surveillance  32  apples,footwear,steel pr.
Reference prices  47  fr.fruit & veg.,maize,wine
Price surveillance  228  text./clothing,iron/steel pr.
Anti-dumping investig.  2  urea,nitr.fertilizers
Undertakings  7  alum.oxide,sulphates,drawn
wood,  glass,  transformers,
el.lamps and bulbs
Source:  Official  sources in the EC  (mainly the EC  Official Journal, GATT
documents, and the EC Tariff Schedules) computerized by UNCTAD.  See Annex III
for more details.
The relative importance in the use of NTBs by the combined member states
of the EC-10 (i.e.,  not EC group measures) in the food sector is given in Table
10.  This table shows the percentage of EC imports from Hungary (in 1984 value
terms,  excluding intra-EC  trade) affected  by different broad categories  of NTBs.
Trade is defined by broad standard groupings (with  SITC item 67 being included
in  Ores and metals).  The types of NTBs have been categorized into  the following
broad categories: price-increasing NTBs  (e.g., variable levies, anti-dumping
duties,  tariff  quotas,  etc),  threats  (e.g., monitoring  systems,  automatic
licensing,  anti-dumping  or  countervailing  investigations.  etc.  ) 8 ,  and
quantitative  restrictions (e.g.,  quotas,  voluntary  export restraints,  restraints
under  the  MFA,  etc.).
The data in Table 10 are aggregated from the data for the individual
member states  which have  applied a  number  of NTBs independently  of  the EC policy.
The continued  existence of  some differences  in the  application of  NTBs by
individual  members states  mainly  results  from  the grandfathering  of  NTBs applied
prior to the Treaty of Rome.  In 1992 with the unification of the market it is
intended that NTBs will only be commonly applied.
8  The inclusion of "threats" as NTBs is based on the chilling effect of
these measures which have been the subject of other  studies.  For example,
Messerlin  (1989) shows that five years after the initiation of anti-dumping
investigations by the EC, imports of items covered in the inquiries dropped to
half the initial level.  Imposition of anti-dumping duties led to even further
reductions in imports.13
It is important  to emphasize  that  the  descriptive  statistic  used  - share
of  imports  affected  by NTBs  (which  is described  in more  detail  in Annex  III)  -
is not  a measure  of the  restrictiveness  of NTBe.  Rather,  it gives  a measure  of
the  incidence  of NTBs,  analogous  to some  extent  to describing  sectors  as being
affected  by non-zero  tariffs.9
Table  10: EC  IMPORTS  FROM  HUNGARY  AFFECTED  BY  NTBS  APPLIED  IN 1988  BY BROAD
IMPORT  CATEGORIES
IMPORTS  NTB  TYPES
1984  PRICE  THREATS  QRS  ALL
$  '000  %  %  %  %
FOOD  PRODUCTS  1123110  64.6  1.9  45.3  64.6
AGRIC.  RAW MATERIALS  237789  0.1  2.3  5.7  7.6
ORES  & METALS  450972  14.1  24.9  30.4  32.5
FUELS  397098  0.0  17.4  9.0  26.5
MNFRS  (INC CHEMICALS)  1651383  17.0  3.8  19.4  24.4
TOTAL  3860352  27.7  7.0  26.3  35.2
Source:  See  Table  9.
In Table  11 information  is given  for each  SITC  division  (excluding  SITC  9)
on the  EC's  NTB  treatment  of Hungary  and  other  broad  groups  of  countries  (the
same  as were  shown  for  tariffs  in Table  8).  The  table  shows  a  significantly
higher  incidence  in the  application  of NTBs  against  Hungary's  trade  than  against
other  groups  of countries  --  even other  "socialist"  countries  --  and against  the
world  in general.
In respect  of individual  SITC  divisions,  there  are only  a few in which  the
share  of trade  from  Hungary  affected  by  some  kind  of NTB  is lower  than  that  for
other groups  of countries.  The final column  also gives  a more  detailed  breakdown
of the  sectors  affected  by  NTBs  than  was  given  in Table  10,  although  only  the
figure  for  "All  types  of NTBs"  is given.  The  breakdown  by different  types  of
broad  categories  of NTBs  is given  in Annex  I, Table  A4.
The  textiles  and  clothing  sectors  are  significant  in  having  very  high
shares  of  imports  from  Hungary,  other  "socialist"  countries,  and  developing
countries  affected  by  NTBs.  In  contrast,  the  share  of  imports  from  OECD
countries  affected  by NTBs  is negligible,  reflecting  their exclusion  from the MFA
or the EC textile  r6gime.  Other  important  sectors  where this type  of differential
is marked  include:  petroleum  and petroleum  products  (SITC  33),  animals  oils  and
fats  (SITC 41),  leather  goods  (SITC 61), paper  and paperboard  manufactures  (SITC
64),  iron  and  steel  (SITC  67),  sanitary  and  plumbing  equipment  (SITC  81)  and
footwear  (SITC 85).  However,  there  are some  sectors  where  the  incidence  of NTBs
against  OECD  countries  is  higher,  e.g.,  transport  equipment,  reflecting  the
application  of VERs  by some  EC countries  against  Japan.
9  Some  recent  econometric  work  suggests  that,  within  certain  bounds,  this
definition  can  be of some  help  in trying  to explain  trade  flows.14
Table  11:  EEC IMPORTS  FROM  PARTNER  GROUPS  AFFECTED  BY NTBS  IN 1988  (X)
SITC  DESCRIPTION  worLd  OECD  SOC  LDCS  MED  EFTA  HUNGARY
ALL  TOTAL  TRADE  13.8  16.0  21.4  20.7  7.5  6.7  35.2
00  LIVE  ANIMALS  59.9  11.3  80.3  55.7  9.8  87.4  88.3
01  MEAT  & PREPARATIONS  83.1  89.0  85.3  74.6  47.6  95.7  39.7
02  DAIRY  PRODUCTS  & EGGS  83.0  85.0  75.7  60.8  38.4  69.7  89.8
03  FISH  &  PREPARATIONS  3.0  34.8  40.9  60.3  48.7  63.6  7.9
04  CEREALS  AND  PREPs  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
05  FRUIT  & VEGETABLES  53.3  68.4  56.7  38.0  61.7  46.4  61.5
06  SUGAR,  honey  98.1  78.1  87.7  99.3  94.8  74.2  58.1
07  COFFEE,  TEA,  COCOA  27.2  37.2  37.5  22.1  9.7  59.9  65.5
08  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  29.2  43.7  24.2  23.0  63.7  4.6  39.8
09  MISC FOOD  PREPARATIONS  49.9  50.1  61.1  14.0  62.4  81.3  85.4
11  BEVERAGES  2.1  3.5  0.8  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.3
12  TOBACCO  &  MANUFACTURES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
21  HIDES,SKINS,  FUR  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
22  OIL SEEDS,NUTS,KERNELS 1.2  2.7  0.8  0.1  0.0  2.7  9.6
23  RUBBER  CRUDE,SYNTHETIC 0.4  0.0  7.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  6.8
24  WOOD,  LUMBER  & CORK  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
25  PULP  AND  WASTE  PAPER  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
26  TEXTILE  FIBERS  12.8  8.7  18.3  12.8  45.5  7.0  18.9
27  CRUDE  FERTILIZERS  18.3  3.1  17.1  16.4  3.5  17.7  40.0
28  METALLIFEROUS  ORES  7.4  12.2  1.9  3.7  0.9  2.5  5.2
29  CRUDE  ANIMAL  VEG  MATs  18.0  14.0  30.2  19.4  14.7  16.1  21.9
32  COAL,COKE,BRIOUETTES  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
33  PETROLEUM  & PRODUCTS  12.3  17.2  28.1  10.5  14.0  4.3  32.6
34  GAS  NATURAL  AND  Mnfd  1.2  0.0  11.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5
35  ELECTRIC  ENERGY  1.5  0.0  11.1  0.0  0.0
41  ANIMAL  OILS  &  FATS  6.6  10.3  2.2  0.2  0.0  1.2  34.4
42  FIXED  VEG.  OILS  & FATS  6.4  2.2  0.2  0.1  98.7  0.2  0.0
43  PROCESD  OILS  & FATS  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.2
51  CHEMICAL  ELMNTS  &  cmpds  1.8  2.6  4.0  0.9  0.0  2.6  1.2
52  MINERAL  TAR  0.8  0.1  3.0  1.0  0.0  0.0  2.9
53  DYEING,  TANNING  MATRLS  0.9  0.7  15.1  5.1  0.0  0.0  7.3
54  MED  & PHARM  PRODUCTS  5.3  5.4  4.9  2.7  4.4  6.8  7.1
55  ESSENTIAL  OILS  S  0.8  0.5  0.1  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
56  FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  1.7  6.6  11.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.5
57  EXPLOSIVES  0.4  0.0  21.7  5.6  0.0  0.0  24.8
58  PLASTIC  MATERIALS  ETC  1.5  1.1  20.2  1.9  0.0  0.0  9.1
59  CHEMICALS  NES  8.2  14.3  6.6  19.4  8.7  1.7  5.5
61  LEATHER/FURS  INC  MANUFS  16.4  11.2  32.1  12.1  92.7  3.5  43.1
62  RUBBER  MANUFACTURES  6.2  0.9  26.4  14.9  0.0  0.0  16.6
63  WOOD  & CORK  MNFS  33.5  23.8  52.1  46.3  4.6  23.2  16.7
64  PAPER/BOARD  & MNFS  35.4  42.2  27.0  12.7  0.0  12.7  78.6
65  TXTL  YARN,  FBRCS,ARTCLS  29.6  1.4  77.6  69.7  0.1  0.6  96.9
66  NON-METALLIC  MIN MNFS  7.3  5.0  36.4  4.6  11.0  0.1  32.7
67  IRON  & STEEL  32.7  19.2  57.9  28.7  8.9  44.5  61.4
68  NON-FERROUS  METALS  2.0  4.4  0.4  0.5  0.1  1.5  5.8
69  METAL  MANUFACTURES  NES  2.5  1.5  7.6  3.5  5.7  2.1  4.3
71  MACHINES  NON-ELECTRIC  4.2  6.6  7.5  0.8  0.1  0.5  11.2
72  MACHINERY  ELECTRIC  6.8  9.9  18.9  7.1  5.4  3.7  7.0
73  TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  11.0  34.3  11.0  3.3  3.4  3.1  7.4
81  SANITARY, ETC EQUIP  3.1  1.1  1.6  5.3  0.2  0.3  62.5
82  FURNITURE  13.1  8.0  21.6  11.5  10.6  9.8  19.6
83  TRAVEL  GOODS,  HANDBAGS 0.2  0.0  2.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.2
84  CLOTHING  52.9  0.2  93.7  77.3  0.3  0.3  90.2
85  FOOTWEAR  40.5  22.7  69.0  45.4  21.3  25.9  66.7
86  PROF. SCIENTIFIC INSTS  5.4  7.5  24.1  1.5  0.9  1.6  3.9
89  MISC MANUFACTURES  NES  3.4  5.5  8.5  3.1  0.1  0.5  3.2
Source:  See Table  9.
Notes:  See Table  8.15
IV.  Recent Chanoes in Huncary's Trade Relations with the EC Hunaary
Hungary  established diplomatic  relations and  signed a nonpreferential
dgreement with the EC in September 1988, based on Article 113  of the Treaty of
Rome.  This agreement provided for the progressive elimination of quantitative
restrictions on Hungarian exports into the EC and access for  Community firms  in
the Hungarian market.  However, textiles and  steel products continue to be
covered  by separate  agreements;  and the  September 1988  agreement  has  only a "best
endeavors  clause"  in  relation to  agricultural products  --  which  means,  in
essence, they are  virtually  excluded.  Hungary continues  to  apply  VERs on  exports
of sheep,  mutton and lamb  to the EC.  These exceptions detract greatly from  the
economic value of the agreement since:
o  EC tariff and nontariff protection is highest for agriculture,
o  Between  a  third  and  a  quarter  of  EC  imports  from  Hungary  are
agricultural products, and
o  Compared to other sectors, agriculture is the most export-oriented
sector in Hungary, with more than 30% being exported.
According  to  Hungarian  officials,  the  September  1988  agreement simply  ended
a dispute between  Hungary and the  EC dating  back to  1975, after Hungary's
accession to the GATT.  The EC declined to apply GATT's Article 13,  abolishing
QRs,  and therefore  did not  confer full GATT  status on Hungary.' 0 Thus, the
September 1988 accord only harmonized positions among OECD countries vis-a-vis
Hungary.  However, Hungary is still considered by the EC to be a "state  trading
country."" This did not prevent the EC  from granting Hungary GSP status on
January 1, 1990 on  "an exceptional basis," as it did for Romania.'2 The US,
Japan and  Austria have done  the same.  Superseding the September 1988 agreement,
which  indicated  such  measures  would  be  phased  in  much  later  on,  all
discriminatory  QRs specifically aimed  at State  Trading countries  were eliminated
on January 1, 1990.  The EC has also suspended provisionally for one year all
general QRs which also affected Hungarian exports.-~ Furthermore, as of March
1990, the EC has agreed to modify the textile agreements in force and to expand
the textile quotas on Hungary's exports in 1990-91  by 13%, an increase  twice  the
rate  suggested by  the MFA,  and valued  at ECU39  million.' 4 There have  been
negotiations  both for nonpreferential  trade  concessions  on  agricultural products
on a reciprocal basis and for the setting up later  this year of an agreement in
'0  Hlingary  has been requesting the removal of those QRs for more than 20
years. It is interesting to note that Italy --  which, together with the FRG,
currently champions the cause of Hungary  in the EC --  was  the country most
reluctant to accede to Hungary'B demands, since it had by far the longest list
of specific QRs on Hungary's exports.
"  Another sign of the low status of the agreement is that according to its
article 12,  member countries are  allowed to sign  economic cooperation  agreements
with Hungary, independently of the EC, thus retaining national authority over
cooperation ventures. The same applies to export credit policies.
'2 The EC's  GSP includes  a limited  list  of agricultural imports on  which the
CCT is partially reduced. According to EIU(1990), both Hungary's access to the
GSP and the abolition of QRs will boost exports by only $50 Mo. annually, a 2%
increase in exports to the EC.
'3  The suspension is not being applied by Spain nor Portugal.
"' Aaence Europe, March 24, 1990.16
the coal and steel sector.'5  The latter  would include  the eliminatior of the EC's
barriers to trade on steel products.  There has already been a 15% increase in
EC quotas applied to a series of countries, including Hungary, which have steel
agreements with the EC." 6
As a result of these actions, the position of Hungary in the EC's pyramid
of privilege has been changing dramatically in  the last year.  Whereas, as late
as early 1989, Hungary was placed in the worst category, it is currently in a
better position than the developing or semi-industrialized countries of Latin
America or  Asia, or the  non-EFTA countries in  the  OECD.  However, it  receives far
worse  treatment  than  that  accorded  to  other  semi-industrialized  economies
bordering  the  Mediterranean,  not  to speak  of  EFTA.  While  the  manufactured exports
of non-EC  Mediterranean  countries enter  the  Community duty-free and  quota-free," 7
Hungary confronts a high frequency of NTBs applied on "sensitive imports"  where
it has a comparative advantage (textiles, clothing, footwear, glass products,
iron  and steel  products, some  chemicals,  electric  lamps  and  bulbs).  Agricultural
exports of nonmember  Mediterranean countries  will be subject to duty-free  tariff
quotas  by  1996, on  a  par  with  Spain  for  some  sensitive  products  and  no
limitations for  others, while Hungarian exports will be restricted by licenses,
seasonal tariffs,  Community  surveillance, quotas  and by  the  Common Customs
Tariff."
V.  Three Challenges to Hungary's Exports
At a time when the Hungarian authorities have opted for a further openir.g
of the economy,  market access to the richest nearby  market is likely  to be vital
to ensure the success of its liberalization  efforts.  Hungary may thus want to
improve further its position in the EC's pyramid of privilege as far as tariff
preferences are concerned.  Yet, such a step must be considered along with
several recent  or future  changes in  the EC  environment of importance for  Hungary
--  the southern enlargement of the EC, the enlargement to include the GDR under
German unification, and  the completion of the  EC's internal  market, scheduled  to
take place by January 1, 1993.  These events acquire  particular relevance given
the size and nature of Hungary's trade with Western markets and the former GDR,
and the new industrial strategy of Hungary, which will rely on an expansion of
exports to the  West.  The impact  on Hungary's economy  may go well beyond that  of
its  direct exports to  the EC.  For instance,  suppliers of intermediary  products,
machinery and equipment have a large influence  in shaping  the economic structure
in  the purchasing  countries  by imposing  their  standards,  patterns,  models, norms,
customs, and procedures.  This is what is  expected to happen after "1992"  with
an all-pervading effect on Hungary's economic environment.  Interestingly, in
1987 40% of the machinery imported by Hungary originated either in the EC or in
the GDR, a share that should increase as the combined result of the agreements
between the EC and Hungary, the latter's country trade liberalization, and the
Is  Hungary received some concessions relating to tariffs, levies and tariff
quotas  on  goose  liver,  onions,  cherries  and  several  other  less  important
products. See also Aaence Europe, April 19, 1990.
16 However, five  EC  member states still  apply national  quotas  on imports from
Hungary(the FRG, Italy and the Benelux countries).
17  There  are,  however,  some  VER  agreements  on  textiles  with  several
Mediterranean countries such as Morocco and Tunisia
!7  Although the latter will be reduced in the future on an m.f.n basis for
some selected products, or by  application of the Community's GSP  scheme to
Hungary.17
modernization strategies adopted by the present government.' 9 If foreign  direct
investment originates predominantly in Western Europe --  and in particular in
Germany --  there is reason to believe that machinery will also originate from
there.
A.  First challenge: The progressive integration  of Spain and ?ortugal into  the
European system of division of labor
According to Hungarian sources, there is ample evidence to show that, as
a result of the enlargement of the EC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal,
trade diversion took place aga4nst Hungary in favor of EC producers of meat,
electrical and textile products in those three markets.  However this will be
minimal compared to the expected full impact of the southern enlargement of the
EC which has not yet affected agricultural exports from Spain.  In fact Spain
(and  Portugal)  will obtain free access  to the  EC for  their agricultural  products
only by 1996.  Bcth countries will improve substantially on their previous,
preferred Mediterranean  status, which  entailed very  few tariff  reductions.
Moreover, the new members will benefit progressively from all the advantages of
the CAP (e.g.,  they will obtain export refunds, receive guaranteed prices, and
so on) which will not take effect until January 1, 1996.
Moreover, the EC has added new protocols to the agreements concluded with
Mediterranean nonmembers in the mid-1970s.  These new protocols provide for  the
progressive  elimination  of  customs  duties  on  traditional  quantities  of fruits  and
vegetables exported to the EC by these third  Mediterranean countries.  As a  quid
pro quo, the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla will be accorded the same
treatment received by other Mediterranean countries under these new additional
protocols.  These, therefore, must be seen as part of "Operation Enlargement."
Spanish and  Portuguese manufactured  exports  were given duty-free  access in
the EC and in  EFTA on July 1, 1989 in advance of what had been scheduled in the
respective  Treaties of Accession to the  EC.  There are, however, some exceptions
for sensitive products (which  Hungary exports to the EC as well) for  which free
market  access  will  be  given  much  later to  Spain  and  Portugal.  Even  for
nonsensitive  manufactured products  the full impact  on Hungary is  going  to  be felt
in the coming months if not years.2'
19  It is difficult to predict how imports of machinery from the ex-GDR will
evolve  once  this territory  will be incorporated  in  the  EC-12.  Some lower  quality,
lower technology imports may be replaced by Western European equipment. On the
other hand, the need for spare part.  will tend to maintain such flow  at least in
the short  run.  Moreover the GDR  will be a partner  to tne  Hungary-EC agreement  and
benefit as  a  GATT  member from  all  the liberalization  measures  adopted by  Hungary.
N  The weight of the FRG is not reflected in Hungarian import statistics,
because  much of the  machinery is imported  through  Austria or produced in  Austria
by German multinationals. More than 75%  of FDI in  Hungary originates in  Austria,
West Germany and Switzerland.
'  Duty-free access into Spanish  and Portuguese industrial  markets by EC and
EFTA countries  will take place  by  January 1, 1993.  The  two acceding countries  are
approximating  their customs  duties progressively to  the level  of the EC's Common
Customs Tariff (CCT),  and will adopt it completely by January 1, 1993 as well
(with the exception of some products for which the deadline  is advanced by
several years). This step invariably implies a reduction in tariff protection
levels on non-EC countries' industrial exports. However given Hungary's trade
patterns, these two future changes will be of minor significance for it.18
The two newcomers are competitors of Hungary in some key areas.  It was
therefore considered  useful to compare  the two countries'  export performances in
specific  sectors with that  of Hungary.  For this purpose we  use  Balassa's
Revealed  Comparative  Advantage2  (RCA), which,  as  a  proxy  for  comparative
advantage, measures the relative share of an industry's exports of one country
in  the total exports of that country to the share  of the same industry's exports
worldwide to world exports  as a whole.  We  computed the  indices for Spain,
Portugal and Hungary for  the years 1986-87 in  relation to the markets of the EC-
10.  Trade data were disaggregated at the SITC four-digit level (see  Annex I
Table A3).  As might be expected, the RCA overlap between Hungary and Spain
includes a number of agricultural exports which are restricted in the EC, such
as meats, fruits  and juices,  vegetables and wine.  Other  major Hungarian exports
(over  SlOm) to the EC for  which Hungary and Spain display a similar comparative
advantage in  the EC-10 are: gasoline, hydrocarbons, footwear and prepared p-rts
of footwear, wood manufactures, rubber tires and tubes, various iron and steel
products, unwrought aluminum,  domestic electrical equipment, furniture,  and fur
clothing.
Hungary's  overlap  with  PortugalIs  RCAs  has  almost  no  agricultural  products,
except wine.  However, it is heavily skewed in the direction of very sensitive
items in the EC, namely, various textile, clothing and footwear items.  Other
overlapped  products  where  Hungary's exports  exceed  $10  million  are  animal
materials  n.e.s.,  hydrocarbons,  nitrogenous  fertilizers,  other  wood  manufactures,
and leather clothing.
B.  Second challenae: The integration of the GDR in the Eurooean Community
The  integration of the  former GDR  into the Ecunder German unity will
inevitably affect Hungary, but the effects can already be assessed tentatively.
First, by the GDR leaving  the CMEA and adopting  the EC's Common Trade Policy new
barriers on trade between that part of Germany which previously constituted the
GDR and Hungary will affect a number of aoods, e.g., footwear and travel goods,
which were part of Hungary's exports to the GDR.  It is impossible  to say if  the
substitution of  Hungary's  undertakings to buy  given quantities  of  (mainly)
industrial  products from the GDR under the CMEA system for  GATT-approved tariff
rates under the EC's Common External Tariff will ihinder  or promote more exports
to the GDR.-
~  See Balassa (1965).  If  the ratio or index is greater than unity this is
generally  interpreted to  mean that  there  is  comparative  advantage  for the
industry/country in question, arid  comparative disadvantage if  the ratio is less
than unity.  However, some care is needed in interpreting these RCA indices.
Yeats  (1985) points out that the RCA index has neither cardinal nor ordinal
properties.  This  means  it iB  eBsentially  binary  --  an RCA greater  than  1 implies
that the exporter has comparative advantage in the sector for which the index
number is  computed and  does not  have comparative  advantaqe in  other sectors. One
cannot say  that a country has greater  comparative advantage in sectors for  which
the  index number  is  higher,  nor  can  one  say  that  a  country  has  greater
comparative advantage in a single sector than in another country which has a
lower index number (that is still greater than one).  This means, for example,
that we could replace the values in  Annex Table A3 with a binary variable, such
as 1/0  or Y/N,  where 1  or Y indicates  comparative advantage and 0 or N indicates
no comparative advantage.
3  In  some  cases, the  entry of  the  GDR  in the  EC  could  have  a very
detrimental effect. For instance,  the GDR has an agreement with Hungary whereby
the latter endeavors to buy all its buses from Hungary, something the EC has
already announced must be discontinued. The Economist, March 31, 1990.
While the EC seems to accept that there is a political imperative for
reunified Germany to take over the legal obligations of the GDR to the USSR at19
Secondly, and more important, Hungarian exporters will encounter stiffer
competition in  the 11  Community markets newly opened to East German exporters.'
Therefore, because  of its  present relevance a  historical comparison of the  GDR's
revealed comparative  advantage in those  11 EC markets  with Hungary's  seems
warranted.  (Annex Table A:3 shows the products where tne GDR index is larger
than 1).
There  is little overlap  in the  agriculture sector in the  comparative
advantage of Hungary and the former GDR.  The main areas where overlap occurs
include:  meat, n.e.s., fresh ,  chilled  or frozen (mcstly  pork), vendered  pig and
poultry fat, oil seeds, nuts, etc., and to a less  extent live animals for food,
n.e.s.  Outside the food sector,  there is  a wide range  of major Hungarian  export
items  where there is  overlapping comparative advantage  with the GOR: distillate
fuels, mineral  jelliee and waxes, hydrocarbons, nitrogen-function compounds,
nitrogenous  fertilizers,  rubber  tires  and  tubes,  other  wood  manufactures,
numerous  iron  and  steel  products,  harvesting machinery,  several  items  of
electrical equipment,  furniture, travel goods, non-knitted textile clothing,
accessories, and fur clothing.  Some of these products are heavily protected in
the EC, not by tariffs but rather by various  NTBs, such as variable levies,  QRs,
VERs.
Thirdly, under German unity the eastern part of the country will receive
&  large amount of new investment and will be eligible for EC aid distributed
through  the  EC's  structural  funds.  Both  will  contribute  to  increased
competitiveness of  former East German  firms exporting the  same products as
Hungary. The highly  protectionist  Common  Agricultural Policy  now  also  covers  the
whole of Germany.  This will impair both Hungary's exports of live animals and
animal  oils there as well as cattle, meat and cereal exports to the rest of the
EC.2
C.  Third challenae : Huncary and "1992"
The Single European Act, which came into force on July 1, 1987, contains
a series  of amendments to the Treaty of Rome, aimed at facilitating  the creation
of an economic space without frontiers in the EC-12 by 1992.  About two thirds
of the 279 new directives, which have to be adopted to complete this ambitious
project, will require only a weighted majority voting, not unanimity as in the
past.  The  deadline  imposed, December  31,  1992,  does  not  appear  totally
unrealistic in view of these new voting rules.  Inspite of the assurances given
by the EC since the autumn of 1988 whereby the 1992  Program is a domestic issue
and does not imply any modification in the level of protection confronted by
extra-EC exporters of goods or services (including  manpower), there is a direct
link  between  internal  liberalization  and  the  trade  of  the  EC  partners,
particularly those on the EC's periphery.  Here a clear distinction must be made
among different groups of traling partners, since the EC applies a regionalist
philocophy to its  common external trade policy.  The instruments  used by the EC
to confer privilege on different groups  of third countries have  been mainly, out
not exclusively, tariff preferences or preferential tariff quotas.  Since the
1992  Program deals mainly with non-tariff  barriers, there is a question whether
the EC  will find it  useful to extend  the concept of  preference to NTBs.  A Priori
this seems  highly likely,  given that  GATT regulations are  much less  pervading in
least for a limited period, this is not the case for other CMEA members. See
Financial Times, March 27, 1990.
>  East German exporters had virtually full  access to the FRG for  more than
30 years.
2  According to The Economist, March 31  1990, the EC expects  increased
surpluses of cereals as a result of applying the CAP regime to the GDR.20
this domain than for tariffs.  There is  no need, for  example, for the EC tc even
try to comply with conditions laid down in Article XXVI of GATT (which relates
exclusively to customs unions and free trade areas).  In practice, then, the EC
can make bilateral deals on NTBs with other countries whenever it wishes.
A June 1989 report2 noted that, since the adoption of the  White Paper and
the ratification of the Single European Act, progress has been hectic.  The
Commission had drafted 274 of the 279 directives required by the White Paper by
December 1989.  By January 1990, 142 new directives of the 279 had been already
adopted by the Council of Ministers, i.e., 60% of the Prograrmme."
Those  EC  officials  consulted  do  not  believe  that  1992  per  se  will
discriminate against Hungary.  Market access is not a major issue for Hungary
(except for the all-important case of  agriculture, as well  as textiles and
iron/steel  products)  but rather the r.eed  for its  own economic adjustment.  There
is total agreement on this, both inside and outside of Hungary, but there is
literally  no  work  under way  at the  EC  Commission specifically  aimed  at  the impact
of  "1992" on Hungary.  The  EC  is concentrating  its effort on  its role as
Consultative Group chairman for emergency help to Hungary and Poland as well as
focusing on the complex East German integration.
A priori the dangers of trade diversion for Hungary as a result of "1992"
are reduced because dependence on EC markets  for most goods affected by the
"1992  program has been relatively small up to now.  Some food  products (such  as
meat  preparations  or  preserved fruit)  are  outstanding  exceptions  because in  their
case both  the EC's share  in total exports  is significant and they will be
affected by  new EC  directives relating to phitosanitary matters.  This may
explain  why Hungarian  experts believe that  the EC should first eliminate  tariffs
and QRs on imports of agricultural, steel and textile products, before tackling
other NTBs.
A perusal  of the  Checchini Report  shows  that the  EC is  expecting a decrease
in  extra-EC imports  of 5  to 7%  on average  according to the  assumptions made.  The
rate  of change is  much larger  for eome sectors (e.g.,  for communications, credit
and insurance) than for others.  In sectors where Hungary displays comparative
advantage (such as textiles or iron and steel products) the expected decrease
ranges from 5 to 12%8  Note however that agriculture was excluded  from the
estimations.  However, it seems implausible that EC imports of all textile and
clothing imports should decline after 1992, particularly if there is also some
opening of this and other sectors as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations
along the lines indicated by the simulation results presented earlier in the
paper.
Penetrating the EC market after 1992 will require, however, even greater
marketing efforts by Hungary's inexperienced exporters.  There will be even
greater  competition  before from  within  the Community  as internal  trade is  further
deregulated under the 1992 Program.  Thus, the main "1992"-linked problem for
Hungarian authorities is that they must succeed not only in making Hungarian
products and services competitive  with those produced currently  by EC firms,  but
>  See Fourth Progress Report of the Commission to the Council and to the
European Parliament concerning the implementation of the Commission's White
Paper, COM(89) 311 final, June 20, 1989.
2  See Financial Times, December  9, 1989;  Acence Eurooe, January 11 1990.  At
the  same time implementation of directives by member states  is slower than
predicted. Of the 88 directives  which should  have been implemented,  only 14 have
actually been implemented by all the member states.
D  See European Economy (1988),  p. 183.21
with those to be produced after 1992.  The challenge of "1992" for Hungarian
exporters  will not  only  be reflected  in  more  competition in  EC markets  but world-
wide.  A clear  example is  exports of railroad  equipment  to the Third  world,  where
Hungary is  currently competing  with EC firms. The latter  presumably  will be able
to lower costs by better exploiting econumies of scale and other productivity
gains derived from EC-92.  Another danger is that investor.a  may play safe by
locating  their capital in an already deregulated post-92 EC.  The potential for
investment diversion  ( or more simply "non-creation") is real and may be an
important impact of  "1992" on  Hungary,' which the  latter may  counteract by
requesting associate EC status, as specified in the next section.`0
Beyond the  issue of  competitiveness there are  some  specific problems
arising from either  the discriminatory abolition of  NTBs  in the  EC or the
"communitarization"  of  some  of  the  individual  members,  policies.
"Communitarization" will affect the visa policies of member states. Nowadays
there is  wide disparity  of treatment  of  Hungarians  wishing to  travel  to countries
of the EC.  For instance, obtaining a visa to visit France takes on average of
three weeks, compared to an hour if the visa is for the FRG. 3 (Before  German
unity, Hungarians did not need visas to viBit  East Germany).
With respect  to  migrant  workers, although  this  has  been  of  minor importance
for  Hungary in  the  past, the  EC's desire  to constrain  the flow  of foreign  workers
means that a common visa policy towards Hungary would in all likelihood hinder
potential migrants from Hungary to Germany which is already heavily affected by
east-west migration within the country.  More restrictive visa and immigration
policies would be unwelcome in Hungary at a time that massive unemployment is
expected as a  secondary outcome  of economic reform.  To put this  issue in
perspective, recent experience in Southern Europe shows that a critical factor
in the success of  liberalization programs was the possibility open to those
unemployed to migrate  to more  prosperous parts  of  Europe.  The best  known
precedent is  the large-scale  emigration from  Spain in  the early 1960s  in  the  wake
of  sweeping liberalization measures  adopted in the period  1957-1959 by  the
Spanish Government.
The EC may take a fresh look into the question of visas required from
Eastern European citizens in the EC.  Interestingly, Italy  tends to line  up  with
West Germany on visa issues.  It  decided last  year that business travellers from
Hungary do  not need visas for  periods  of less  than  one month, a step  that Austria
took in the mid-1970s, before scrapping visas altogether.  Italy is said to be
pressing  other EC countries  to suppress  visas  on  Hungary's travellers  at  the same
time that this will be done for the GDR. 32
The elimination of NTBs on intra-EC trade may affect Hungary in several
ways; but some may be considered of critical importance:
29  See Tomann, H.(1989), p.308.
30  Note however that even associate status would not preclude Hungarian
suppliers from being negatively affected by new local content and origin rules,
which are part and parcel of some of the directives facilitating intra-EC trade
in goods and services, e.g., in the domain of government procurement.
"  Two years ago, the FRG was studying the possibility of suppressing the
need for  visas for  Hungarian travellers, but France and the UK opposed it  on the
grounds that Germany wouli have to go back and impose visas in "1992,"  once visa
policies would have to be harmonized in the EC.
32  See Aaence Europe, April 12, 1990.22
1)  Deregulation of road transport in the EC will be a challenge for
Hungarocamion, Hungary's very  efficient trucking firm.  Hungarocamion now
handles considerable road cargo between Europe and the Middle East via
Budapest.  EC-92  road  liberalization  will  permit  --  for  example  --  an
Italian firm to supply transport services from Greece to Denmark without
any restriction,  while  this possibility  will not  be open to Hungarocamion.
Hungary  would  like  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the  EC  to  increase
Hungarocamion'  s options,  but  the EC may  ask  for  some  reciprocity.
Viewed  from another angle, the liberalization of  road transport rules
inside the EC will favor  consumers of products that embody those services
relatively intensively,  like  perishable  products from  Hungary, but it  will
also be  advantageous for some of their competitors in Southern Europe
which use trucks  to convey their fruits  and vegetables to  Central European
markets.  Producers of similar products transported from further away by
other  transport moJes will  be  adversely affected.  In any event  the
deregulation of road transport will probably stimulate Hungarian exports
of products where the share of freight in  costs is  high such as perishable
animal and vegetable products.
2) On the other hand, the elimination of border formalities on intra-EC
trade  (e.g.,  passport  controls,  exchange  controls,  origin  controls,
statistical  reporting,  transit  noticing)3  will  be  detrimental  to
Hungarian  exporters of perishable products (e.g.,  food  exports) competing
with domestic EC producers and where prompt delivery is a key element.
3) Of less critical importance for Hungary are changes in the regulatory
environment concerning norms, standards and certification.  It  will only
be an issue in A  few selected cases.  For instance, Hungary is not a
member  of  such  European  standards  organizations  as  CEN  or  CENELEC.
However,  Rdjusting to  EC norms should not be  an  issue since  in many
instances it has  adopted German  norms.  The  high  level of  standards
imposed  by the  FRG has  accustomed  Hungarian firms to coping  with difficult
technical problems.  For instance, traditional exporters of electrical
equipment are accustomed to Western demands. This is not true, however,
for  many other sectors,  where firms have  been producing according  to CMEA,
Soviet or Hungarian standards. Switching to EC  standards may  be more
difficult  in those  cases.
In spite of the optimism on norms and standards, there are currently some
problems with health standards in food products which must be overcome.
A typical example is that the EC requires certain steel qualities to be
used in some canned products which are not available in Hungary.
After 1992, inspection  of food  products produced in  the EC will be done at
source, but  imports  from Hungary will be  in general  inspected at the EC's
external borders and then issued a "passport"  allowing for free circulation in
the EC.  The "passport"  will  then be checked  at the  point of arrival.  This gives
an  advantage to  the  domestic EC  producer because  any  failure to  pass  the
inspection does not involve substantial costs as for the non-EC producer in
Hungary.  This puts Hungary's  meat exports  at a  disadvantage when compared, say,
to the GDR, which will be included in the Internal Market.
There are some  positive aspects for  Hungary from  the Internal  Market, such
as:
1)  A reduction in  the number  of norms and standards (from 12  to 1)  with
which  producers will  have  to  comply once  minimum  European-wide
33  I.e., the obligation imposed  on shippers to submit a transit notice upon
entering each member state in the course of a Community transit operation.23
standards have been adopted, allowing for free circulation in the
Community  for  approved  products.  This  is  very  important  for
Hunlgary's  food  and  machinery  sectors,  which  may  be  able  to  achieve
some economies of  scale, thanks to the  dismantling of the  EC's
internal technical barriers.
2)  A reduction in the number of tests and inspectiGns to be overcome
for some types of products in order to sell in different EC member
countries;  obtaining  a  certificate  from one  of  the  EC-approved
laboratories will be enough.  The main beneficiaries  in Hungary
would be food, chemical, pharmaceutical and equipment industries.
3)  Although there is considerable debate in the EC itself about the
specific impact  that the  complezion  of the EC's Internal  Market  will
have  on growth rates,' there is consensus that there will be  a
significant and positive impact on the present level of the EC's
GDP. 35 The exact effect this increased  demand will have on Hungary's
exports  to  the  EC will  depend  on the  success  of  Hungary'B  preBent
adjustment  efforts.  Nevertheless, the  most positive impact could  be
expected on industries  producing goods or services  with high income
elasticities  of final  demand  in the EC --  such  as tourism  --  but  for
most other Hungarian exports, pr'lary products  (including food),
clothing  or machinery,  income  elasuLicities are  low or very  low.36
Among the measures of the EC-92 program there is one likely to have a
detrimental effect on Hungary's  exports of agricultural  exports: the doubling of
the EC structural funds until 1992.  This may reduce export opportunities from
Hungary's producers of fruit, vegetables, and spices since one of the guiding
principles  of  the  fund  is to promote  the  diversification of  production  in
Southern EuroPe away from products where the degree of EC self-sufficiency is
already high.
One logistical  problem that EC-1992 presents for  Hungary is  that its firms
are not  well represented in the  EC and that there is little  time in the less  than
1000 days available in which to establish viable subsidiaries or branches in
order  to  overcome  potential  discrimination  between  established  and  non-
established firms deriving from "1992" or -re-empt  reciprocity requests by the
'4  See estimates in  Commission (1988),  i.e.,  the Cecchini Report, Centre for
Business Strategy (1989),  The Economist, November 18,  1989.  The Checchini Report
estimated that the EC's GDP would increase  by a minimum of 4.5% after a period
of five years.
35  Another expected  source of growth  is now German reunification which
according to some estimations  would add .5%  to the  EC growth rate. See Financial
Times, March 31, 1990; Agence Europe, April 21, 1990.
`6 Income  elasticities of demand for primary products range from .3 for raw
materials to  .7 for nonferrous metals, with the exception of fuels(1.9). See
Balassa, B.  (1987). In the case of the EC, however, the income elasticity of
demand for fuels is considerably lower, ranging from .5 to .8.
3 Yannopoulos, G.(1988), pp.103-12. Much of the GDR's territory would be
classified  as  regions  which  are  the  focus of  the  reorganized  funds.  The
Commission has already stressed that no aid  will be granted to the detriment of
the current beneficiary regions, which means an additional impact on outsiders
such as Hungary.24
EC.  It is  difficult to envisage such a  possi.bility  in  Hungary, not only because
capital is not the abundant factor, but also because of the tremendous balance
of payment and foreign debt problems the country currently faces,  with even
tighter exchange controls likely to be imposed in the future.
Finally, mention should  be  made of  two sectors  for  which the  changes in  the
regulatory  environment implied  by EC-92  are quite cc  itradictory  and the same  may
have a  substantial  impact on  Hungary's economy:  air  transport  and tourism
services.
(i)  Air Transport
Three aviation issues affect Hungary:
a) Non-EC countries are worried that fifth freedom rights (the right of
a carrier based in one country to offer services between two foreign countries)
they have  with individual EC countries  may be impdired now  that the EC is likely
to  act  as  a  single  country.  Negotiation  of  'anding rights  with  a  body
representing 12 countries instead  of one implies  a change  of bargaining power in
favor of the European partner.  Hungary's airline,  Malev, w.ll be in a  very weak
bargaining position with the EC.
b)  The disappearance  of  tax-free  shopping  on intra-EC  traffic improves  the
competitive  position of  non-EC members  as  a  tourist  destination.  Airport
authorities may raise EC landing fees to compensate for the disappearance of a
very lucrative source of revenue.  Ir sum, the post-1992 regime max divert some
tourists away from the EC to alternative, Hungarian destinations.
c) On the other hand, intra-European air transport deregulation should
lead,  according  to different studies, 41 to a 10  to 20% reduction in  most intra-EC
air fares.' 2 This implies some trade diversion against Hungary  (less tourist
arrivals, etc.) unless air fares to and from Hungary are also reduced.
Because of the critical importance of air transport to services exported
by  Hungary to  the  EC-12  and of  the  lack of  competitiveness of  Malev,  the
privatization of this airline should be a high priority.  A recent World Bank
i"  A new directive, which  is a part of the EC-92 program, is geared to
conferring  freedom  of  providing  banking  services  by  EC-based  financial
institutions, but  this  privilege will  not be  extended  to  third  countries'
financial firms unless those countries pass a reciprocity test.
3  According to the last EIU Hungary Country Report, foreign debt stood at
$20.7  bn at the end of December 1989.  The debt-service ratio is currently higher
than 40%. See EIU(1990).
4  See  Acence  Europe,  October  21,  1989. According  to  a  study of  the
Netherlands  Economic institute  air fares  on intra-EC  travel  could increase  by 10%
on this account  and estimates that Greece could see its income from  tourism drop
by 10%. See also Financial Times, March 9, 1990.
4l  See International  Herald Tribune, June 1, 1988;  Commission(1988), p.98.
42 EC transport  ministers  decided in  early  December 1989  that airlines flying
between community destinations will be able to cut fares by up to  20% from
January 1, 1990 without needing approval from countries at both ends of the
route, but only from  one of the two. See International  Herald Tribune, December
12, 1989.25
study" 1 shows  that  price  elasticities  of  air  freight  demand  are  fairly  high,
ranging  from  -0.8  to  -1.6,  while  price  elasticities  of  air  transport  for
passengers  on vacation  stretch  from  -1.1  to -2.7.  This  points  to the tremendous
rewards  that  any  policy  of air transport  cost  reduction  could  have  for Hungary.
(ii) Tourism
The  abolition  of  all  exchange  controls  in most  EC  countries  by  1990  is
bound  to  increase  travel.  Tourism  to Hungary  is also  likely  to be affected  by
changes  in the  internal  market  for production  factors.  A unified  factor  market
will  facilitate  intra-European  labor  mobility,  which  in  turn  will  lead  to  a
convergence  of  labor  costs  in the  iC-12.  In other  words,  the  cost  of  labor-
intensive  activities,  like  tourism  in Southern  Europe  (particularly  in the  new
member  countries),  is bound  to rise  substantially.  Moreover,  Spain  and Portugal
must  adjust  themselves  entirely  to the Common  Agricultural  Policy  by 1996, a move
implying  a substantial  increase  in the price  of food  in the two  countries.  Both
trends  are bound  to lead  Northern  and  Central  Europeans  to travel  further  south
and east.  Hungary  should  be able  to capture  some  of the  increased  demand.  This
is only  possible  if the  relative  price  of air transport  between  EC countries  and
Hungary  in terms  of the price  of North-South  intra-EC  routes  does  not increase,
thus  canceling  the  favorable  impact  of  the  completion  of  the  Internal  Market
listed  above.
VI.  Hungary's  Future  Trade  Reaime  with  Western  Europe
Hungary  is considering  strengthening  its ties with Western  Europe  since the
CMEA  is  disintegrating;  transferable-ruble  trade  will  soon  be  eliminated.
Hungary's  position  is a difficult  one.  As an economic  partner  of the USSR  up to
the mid-1980s,  it could  obtain  its energy  and  raw materials  at very  good  terms,
in view  of the  low-quality  manufactured  goods  it was  able  to use to pay its CMEA
partners.  This  has  been  changing.  On the  one  hand  a growing  share  of  imports
have  had  to  be  paid  with  "hard  goods,"  including  agricultural  products  or
manufactured  goods  with  import  content  from the West  (e.g., electronic  consumer
goods,  measuring  instruments  and metal-working  machinery).  On the  other  hand,
the USSR  has been  using  an increasing  share  of "soft  goods"  in its barter  trade
with  Hungary  (e.g.,  iron-ore  with  low  iron  content,  coal  aiid  lumber  which  when
delivered  are  frozen,  so that  they  cannot  be  ignited  easily;  gas  and  crude  oil
have  been  delivered  erratically).  One  result  has  been  that  Hungary  has
accumulated  unconvertible  ruble  surpluses  which  cannot  be  used  in  trade  with
other  CMEA  partners  and  which  are  hard  to  use  in  future  trade  and  payments
agreements."  Thus  they  must  be considered  as a non-interest  bearing  loan  with
undetermined  maturity  to the  USSR.  The  government  limited  exports  to the  USSR
on a temporary  basis  beginning  January  18, 1990, after  cutting  subsidies  to firms
exporting  to  CMEA  countries  in July  1988.45  These  restrictions  have  led  to the
temporary  closing  of  plants  or  layoffs  in  plants  whose  output  is mainly  for
export  to the  USSR.  Economic  adjustment  will  be  painful  and  likely  to  create
mass  unemployment.
If trade  with  the USSR,  an important  trade  partner,  is less  desirable  for
Hungary,  it has  apparently  no other  realistic  option  than  to turn  to the  West,
41  Oum,  T.H.  et al.(1990).
44  This  happened  for  the  first  time  in 1988,  when  the  surplus  reached  424
million  TRe.
I  EIU,  nr.4,1988.  Interestingly,  subsidies  and  other  incentives  schemes
given  to exporters  to the West  have  not  been  cut.26
and  as indicated  in our  simulations  (see below),  closer  relations  could  lead to
substantially  greater  trade.  Indeed,  some Hungarian  economists  predict  that the
EC could  replace  the USSR  as an outlet  for Hungarian  goods.'  However,  there  is
no  question  that  Hungary  also  faces  considerable  supply  constraints,  since  at
least  in  the  short  term  a  shift  of  industrial  exports  from  CMEA  to  Western
markets  can  be  done  only  at  high  cost.  Much  of  the  embodied  technology  and
physical  capital  is unadapted  and  would  have  to  be  scrapped  altogether.  The
transportation  infrastructure  is geared  to trade with  CMEA  countries.  But there
is  currently  substantial  uncertainty  on  the  kind  of  institutional  links  that
Hungary  should  strive  for  with  Western  European  economies.  Prime  Minister
Antall,  expressed  the wish  in mid-April  1990  that  his country  become  a member  of
the  EC between  1992  and  1995.4'  The  possibility  of applying  for membership  in
EFTA  was evoked  by the president  of the Hungarian  Socialist  Party  in June  1989,
as a stepping  stone  for EC membership  later on."  Although  this  view  is rejected
by the  EC,  the  idea  has  some  merit  from  another  perspective.  As  a member  of
EFTA,  Hungary  would  also  become  a member  of the European  Economic  Space  which  is
currently  being  negotiated  between  the  EC and  EFTA  members.  Membership  in EFTA
may not  affect  relations  with  the  USSR,  given  the  Finnish  precedent.
49 However,
membership  in  EFTA  is  not  so  attractive  as  it  seems  for  Hungary  since  (1)
agriculture  is not covered  by EFTA  nor by present  and pending  EC-EFTA  agreements,
(2) the only  important  EFTA market  for Hungary  is Austria,  which  may soon  opt out
of  EFTA  to enter  the  EC.  EFTA  members,  moreover,  have  not  shown  a particular
interest  in fostering  links with  European  developing  countries  and may perceive
an enlargement  of EFTA  as a distraction  from  their  plans  to  reach  an agreement
on  the  EES  with  the  EC.  There  are  other  reasons  why  EFTA  may  be reluctant  to
admit  new Eastern  European  members.  Their  currencies  are not convertible;  their
economies  are not market  oriented;  and EFTA  rules  do not  facilitate  the entry of
new  members.  The  reason  membership  in EFTA  is  proposed  by  Hungary  is  often
political:  EFTA  is  more  "neutral"  than  the  EC,  less  political  and  more
economically  focussed;  not  at all  linked  with  NATO.
Barring  EC or EFTA  membership,  the  possibility  of defining  a new  kind  of
relationship  with  the  EC is currently  being  examined  in different  quarters.  To
start  with,  the  EC  has  some  experience  in dealing  with  developing  countries  in
its  periphery  (which  incidentally  EFTA  has  not).  The  Yugoslavia-EC  agreements
might  be  a modei  to  be  followed.  Other  possible  models  are  the  Greece-EC  or
Turkey-EC  association  agreements  of che 1960s.  This would  be only a second-best,
however,  since discrimination  in EC markets  is largest  for Hungarian  agricultural
(both horticultural  and meat)  exports.  The main  advantage  of association  is that
it would  send  a  very  important  signal  to  foreign  investors  looking  for  easy
access  to large  markets.
The EC may be preparing  to negotiate  with  each  CMEA  country  what  are called
"special  association  agreements,"  which place CMEA countries  somewhere  in between
EFTA  and  the  Mediterranean  nonmember  countries  in the  pyramid  of preferences.
4e  See  International  Herald  Tribune,  March  24, 1989.  The FRG  had guaranteed
a $1 billion  loan  to Hungary  much  before  the EC did  in early  1990.  The  FRG  is
already  well  represented  in Hungary's  cultural  and  academic  life  when  -7ompared
to other EC countries  (Goethe  Instituce,  F.Naumann  Foundation).  German  firms are
deemed  to be eager  to  expand  subcontracting  activities  they  have  already  with
many  Hungarian  firms.  This  can be facilitated  by offering  to Hungary  a generous
EC trade  agreement.  About  half  the  joint  ventures  of Hungarian  firms  are with
West  German  firms.  Financial  Times,  March  23,  1990.
4'  Aaence  Europe,  April  18 1990.
4  See  Kostrzewa,W.  and  Schmieding,H.(1989),p.514.
49  Kostrzewa,  W.and  Schmieding,  H.(1989)27
The  idea  would  be  to  go  beyond  the  usual  concessions  contained  in  the
Mediterranean agreements (in  trade, finance  and social security)  and extend  them
to  cultural, educational,  information and  technological  areas.  "Political
dialogue"  would also be institutionalized. On the other hand,  there would be no
mention in the agreements of the possibility of membership at a later stage,
which would give them less status than the 1963 Turkey-EC agreement.  There is
likely to be considerable debate inside the EC concerning the extent of trade
concessions to CMEA countries.  In particular, the Mediterranean members of the
EC (including  France)  want the EC to limit its  generosity both because they fear
new competition in agricultural and other sensitive products, but also because
they want to limit the erosion of the status of Maghreb countries in the EC's
system of foreign economic relations.
It  is not  clear yet  if the  association agreements would be  based on
reciprocity.  More likely  than not,  Hungary would not  be asked to reciprocate  at
this stage,  pending  Hungary's  transition  to a  market economy.  This  would  obviate
the need to address in the short term the difficult question of how to treat
imports from the USSR and other CMEA members once a decision to give reverse
preferences to the EC-12 would have been taken.
VII.  Simulations of the  Possible Effects of  Changes in  the EC  Merchandise Trade
RMaime
Following recent  reforms in Eastern Europe, the EC  and other Western
countries have indicated their willingness to revise the treatment accorded to
the  East and some changes  have already  been implemented. There are  also a  number
of other changes being discussed in  Europe, such as the extension of the EC and
the  European  space  concept,  and the  GATT-sponsored  Uruguay  Round of  trade
negotiations is drawing to a close.  To attempt to capture the direct trade
impact  of possible changes  on Hungary, a series of simulations have  been carried
out  using a standard  partial  equilibrium  trade  model for  the estimation  of  direct
trade effects of various trade liberalization  scenarios for  trade in goods - see
Annex II for more details on the model and the data used for the simulations.
This type of model does not  take account of the economy-wide effects  of changes,
such  as  inter-industry effects, exchange  rate  effects  and the  stimulus to
investment.  On the other hand, calculations are made at a very detailed level,
the national tariff line, and aggregated for reporting purposes.`
on the basis of the defined scenarios and the basic parameters, the model
computes the estimated direct trade effects:
(i)  trade creation (or loss) following  a change in  tariff rates or non-
tariff barriers.  This results from changes in demand in the market
as a consequence  of price changes  associated  with tariff changes (it
is assumed that the price change will  fully reflect the tariff
change, i.e., that the benefits of the tariff change are passed on
to consumers); and
(ii)  trade diversion - the substitution  of goods coming from  the  exporter
for goods from other foreign suppliers, or vice-versa, resulting
from changes in relative import prices ae6ociated with changes in
tariffs facing  different trading partners.  Changes  may result from
"  The national tariff line (according  to the NIMEXE classification of the
EC)  results  were  then  concorded to  the  SITC  (Standard International Trade
Classification) for  reporting  purposes. Since  the concordance  between  the  NIMEXE
and the SITC is not perfect some misallocation of results to SITC categories
could occur.28
the existence of differential rates before the liberalization or
from liberalization  which is not equal for all trading partners.
Trade creation and trade diversion effects are summed to calculate the
total effect.
The model  has  been  designed  to estimate  the  effects of  trade liberalization
scenarios in  which ad  valorem rates  are  modified.  Data  on ad valorem  tariffs are
taken from the GATT Tariff Study.  However, as we have seen, the  EC applies NTBs
in  many sectors  and any realistic  attempt at  modeling trade liberalization  needs
to take these into account.  The approach we have used to handle NTBs is  to use
data compiled from prior micro-economic studies on the ad valorem equivalent of
non-tariff barriers.  This was taken from a survey by Laird and Yeats (1990a).
Some comments need to be made on the studies surveyed by Laird and Yeats.
Typically,  these  studies  identify  the  price  disadvantage  of  domestically  produced
goods relative to  the goods' international  prices.  The ad  valorem equivalent of
an NTB is assumed to equal the percentage price disadvantage lees the tariff
rate.  Of course, this method at best gives a  rough order of magnitude for the
trade effects of NTBs, for several reasons.  The NTBs themselves have changed
(generally increased) since these studies were carried out.  In addition, ad
valorem "tariff  equivalents" vary  according to international  prices.  Also, NTBs
have effects that are not fu ly captured by the idea of "tariff equivalents" -
some NTBs operate on demand  J.  g., quotas)  while others operate  on supply (e.g.,
voluntary export restraints).
While international  prices  were used  to  compute  price  disadvantages in  some
of these studies, an alternative approach was used for products affected by
variable levies in the EC --  mainly agricultural products.  For such products,
data are available on these levies over time and were used to compute average
price  disadvantages over a  three  to five  year  period (wit-hin  the  period 1975-83).
One problem  needs a special  mention.  The NTB studies  surveyed  do not allow
the  computation  of  tariff  equivalents of  NTBs  separately  for  each trading
partner.  The prices disadvantages are against the international price.  Thus,
we cannot say, for example, that  Hungary is  more or less penalized by EC NTBs on
the basis of these data.  The only exception to  this is  that  we know  that the MFA
applies only to the main textile and clothing exporters and the  "socialist"
countries  were similarly  affected  by the  EC textile  r6gime.  Accordingly, for  all
products in these categories we have assumed that the ad valorem equivalent of
the NTBs does not apply to OECD countries.  In all other cases we have assumed
that EC NTBs are equally applied to all non-EC countries.
A number of possible scenarios  were modelled.  First,  we examined the idea
of the EC  granting Hungary better treatment in its trade regime than at  present.
Secondly, we considered possible results from the Uruguay Round and how these
might affect  Hungary, including  in  the context  of  possible improved  treatment not
associated  with the Uruguay Round.  Finally, we considered how Hungary might be
affected within the concept of a wider European economic "space".
These scenarios need some further explanation, but first a qualification
about the data.  For all the scenarios we have modified the base data - which
relates  to the trade r6gime  of the  EC-10 as it  existed in 1983  - to include Spain
and Portugal within  the EC.  However, we  did not  have data on  Spain's or
Portugal's imports and, therefore, were not able to alter the base to include
them.  Thus, we look at the scenarios modifying the behavior of the EC-10, but
with Spain and Portugal getting EC treatment.  In fact, as we shall see, this
scenario provides an opportunity to see the diversion of trade from within the
EC to other trading partners as the external barriers are removed --  and to
understand the  political  sensitivities  of  Southern  European  countries,  now in  the
EC, to any further opening of the market to possible compe_itors.29
Given this  starting  point,  the first  set  of scenarios  exanines  the  possible
effects of improved treatment for Hungary in isolation from other changes that
are taking place.  First,  we consider  the granting of GSP treatment by the EC to
Hungary.  We computed the average GSP rate, tariff item by item, and allocated
this average rate to Hungary.  Second, we consider the granting to Hungary of
similar  treatment  to  that  accorded  to  the  Mediterranean  countries  under  bilateral
arrangements with the EC, again by allocating the average tariff available to
these countries.  Third, we consider the implications of Hungary getting the
same treatment as EFTA countries (in  effect, of Hungary joining EFTA).  Again,
the average rate for these countries was allocated to Hungary.  (This implies
setting  virtually  all  tariffs  outside  the  agricultural  sector  to  zero).
Finally, we consider the effects of Hungisy attaining membership of the EC, in
which case all  tariffs are set  to zero  ane axternal  NTBe are also eliminated for
Hungary.  In the other three scenarios NTBs remain unchanged.
In  the second  set  of scenarios  we consider  the  effects  of the Uruguay  Round
and then we superimpose onto those the effects of changed treatment for  Hungary
along the lines of the first set of scenarios.  The Uruguay Round is, at the
time of writing, still under way and it is impossible to be precise about the
type of package that  might be finally  negotiated.  We do not  make any claims as
to the realism  of our assumptions  about the outcome of the Round, only that they
give an order of magnitude along the lines that have been discussed by a wide
range of  countries representing different  interests.  We  have, therefore,
ventured to include in our scenarios the following assumptions:
- In the  agricultural  sector, the  overall  level  of  support will
decrease by 20 percent.  Thus we reduce the ad valorem equivalent
of our package of tariffs and NTBs by some 20 percent.
- In  the  textiles  and  clothing  sectors,  we  have  left  tariffs
unchanged, but we eliminate all NTBs - along the lines of proposals
for the elimination  of the MFA, but  we include  the EC textile regime
in the package.
- for all other  sectors  we reduce  tariffs  by 30 per cent  - the overall
objective  for the  Round
Our  third  set of  scenarios concerns the  idea of establishing a wider
European  economic  space, encompassing the EC  and  EFTA as well  as Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and the GDR (which  was not part of
Germany in our data base).  Apart from the wide geographical concept we have
adopted, we have taken the trade regime of the concept to cover either of two
possibilities.  One is  a zero tariff r6gime, including in  agriculture, but with
no changes in  NTBs, and  the second implies  the elimination  of NTBs as  well as  the
establishment of zero tariffs.
The overall direct effects on Hungary's merchandise exports under these
scenarios are shown in Table 12.  The first column shows the import base which
is used for the simulation exercises.  The second column looks at the possible
effects on Hungary of several possible changes in the tariff treatment which
Hungary could receive bilaterally from the EC.  The third column looks at the
same  changes,  as  well as  the possible  effects  of participation  wider arrangements
for the whole  of  Europe  (the "European space"), but  all these  results are
examined in the context of the posited changes that might occur as a result of
the implementation of the Uruguay Round results (as  outlined earlier).
The change which would be expected to lead to the greatest expansion of
imports from Hungary, a projected 48 percent increase, would come from full
membership of the EC.  The increase would be somewhat less under the Uruguay
Round liberalization scenario  - only 43  percent.  The difference between  the two
results is  that there is  a greater  gain  to Hungary  through the diversion  of trade
of third countries if Hungary alone were to join  the EC, whereas Ln the Uruguay30
Round scernario  other countries also benefit from the  reduction of the EC's
external barriers, with the consequence of less  gains for Hunga.y.
Compared to its present treatment, Hungary would gain progressively more
from GSP treatment, special Mediterranean preferences, and from membership of
EFTA, in that order.  In all of these cases the additional liberalization that
would occur under the Uruguay Round scenarios is greater than in the absence of
the Uruguay Round, outweighing any  erosion of such preferences.  The  main reason
for this is that in the Uruguay Round scenarios there is a reduction of non-
tariff barriers in the agriculture sector and the elimination of MFA  (with no
tariff  changes)  in the  textiles  and  clothing  sector.  Under  the  improved
preference scenarios,  tariffs  alone  are  reduced,  with no  changas in  the incidence
of non-tariff barriers.  It is also noted that Hungary would expect to get  more
from  the Uruguay Round scenarios alone than it  would from  GSP in the absence of
the  Uruguay  Round,  i.e.  MFN  liberalization  would  serve  it  better  than
"preferential"  treatment.
The final two results shown in Table 12 relate to the creation of a wider
European space,  with a  projected 24.4 percent  expansion from  the reduction of EC
tariffs  to zero for  all  European  countries  and a  37.9  percent expansion following
the elimination of NTBs as well as the tariff reductions.
we now look more closely at the sectoral breakdown of the results by two
digit StTC,  Revision 1, categories  - see  Table 13.  In  the first set  of scenarios
- reflecting  improved preferential tariff  treatment  for Hungary  alone, the
sectoral  breakdown  typically  reflects  the  overall  results,  namely  that  membership
of the EFTA is better than the treatment afforded under the Mediterranean rate
which in turn is better than the treatment under the GSP provisions.  However,
in agriculture  the gains under GSP and Mediterranean country treatment are also
greater than the gains that would be obtained from membership of EFTA.  In the
case of  EC  membership  the  sectoral  results are  similar to  those  for EFTA
membership in  the  manufactures sub-sectors,  reflecting  the duty free trade  under
the EC-EFTA Protocol, but EC membership brings markedly greater gains in the
agriculture and related sectors.  The sectors  where the greatest gains are to be
obtained from EC membership would be, in declining order: iron and steel, meat
and meat preparations, fruits and vegetables, textiles, and clothing.
The second set of scenarios --  in which the assumed Uruguay Round results
provide a backdrop for looking at the effects of improved treatment for Hungary
in  the EC.  As in the first set of scenarios, the greatest gains are under the
scenario in which Hungary gains EC membership. Setting this aside, and outside
the food categories,  the greatest gains  would, with few  exceptions, be from  EFTA
membership,  receipt  of  Mediterranean  preferences,  and  GSP  treatment, in  declining
order.  For products with no NTBs, EFTA membership would be as good as being in
the EC itself.  In  the food categories, the treatment typically accorded to GSP
beneficiaries and Mediterranean countries would be preferable to that accorded
EFTA  countries,  and  the  treatment  of  the  Mediterranean  countries  is  significantly
better than GSP treatment in some categories.31
Table  12: Effects  on Hungary  of changes  in EC merchandise  trade  policy  r6gime
Imports  Estimated  trade  increase
1983  No U.R.  Uruguay  Round
$S000  $S000  $'000
969305
No special  treatment  81049  8.4
Hungary  gets  treatment  of:
- GSP  beneficiaries  57984  6.0  125071  12.9
- Mediterranean  countries  96086  9.9  155036  16.0
- EFTA  countries  145063  15.0  187848  19.4
- Other  EC  countries  465654  48.0  418055  43.1
Hungary  benefits  from:
- European  space  (tariffs=0)  236978  24.4
- European  space  (tariffs  & NTBS=0)  367372  37.9
In the  case  of EC treatment,  the  categories  recording  the  greatest  gains
in absolute  terms  are,  in descending  order:  iron and  steel  (SITC 67),  meat  and
meat  preparations  (SITC 01),  fruit  and vegetables  (SITC 04),  clothing  (SITC 84)
and textiles  (SITC 65).  The gains  in the  latter  category  are twice  as great  as
for  the  next  category  - electrical  machinery  (SITC  72).  In non-EC  scenarios
(overlaying  the  Uruguay  Round  results  in which  NTBs  are  reduced  in agriculture,
textiles  and clothing),  the greatest  gains are recorded  in textiles  and clothing,
followed  by a wide  range  of chemicals  and other manufacturing  categories.  Fruit
and  vegetables,  meat  and  even  beverages  do well  in the  food  categories.  An
examination  of  the  results  for  individual  tariff  items  - not  reported  here
because  of the enormous  amount  of detail  - show that  in these  sectors  the results
are quite  widespread,  i.e.,  they  are  not a consequence  of the  changes  for a few
items  only.  This  reflects  Hungary's  diversified  production  base.
The winners  and losers  among  countries  other  than Hungary  are not  reported
in  detail  for  the  various  scenarios,  but  we  comment  on  some  of  the  more
interesting  results.  Under  all  the  Uruguay  Round  scenarios,  the  major  trade
diversion  losses  --  a combined  total  of some  $1.3 billion  --  accrue  to Portugal
and Spain  which  are  now within  the EC.  The negative  effects  --  some  $75 million
--  are much  smaller  for Sweden  and smaller  again  for Norway  ($27 million),  both
of  which  benefit  from  the  EC's  special  arrangements  for  duty  free  entry  of
manufactures  from EFTA  countries.  These  losses  --  which  result  from the erosion
of the preferential  margin  these  countries  have  over  Hungary  in the EC market  --
are  the  largest  we  estimate  under  any of the  scenarios.  There  are only  modest
losses  through  trade diversion  for some ACP countries  which  currently  are at the
top  of  the  EC's  pyramid  of  preferences  because  of  the  Lome  Convention
arrangements.  (The  greatest  losses  are  $5 million  for  Uganda,  $3 million  for
Ethiopia  and  $2.7  million  for  Somalia).  However,  under  non-Uruguay  Round
scenarios  the  losses  are  much  more  modest  and  spread  among  a  wider  group  of
countries,  e.g.,  losse3  are  recorded  for  the  US  ($26  million),  Spain  ($36
million),  Portugal  ($12 million)  if  Hungary  were  to  join  the  EC,  but  under  the
pure  GSP  scenario  the  losses  to Spain  and  Portugal  are  estimated  at only  $3.1
million  and $1.1  million,  respectively.  This suggests  that  fears of trade  losses
to  Southern  European  members  of  the  EC  from  its  possible  expansion  to  cover
Hungary  at least  are  greatly  exaggerated.32
It is  emphasized  that theme  results are  based  on a simulation  model and are
directly linked  to the assumptions  and the parameters used.  Moreover, the model
is of a comparative static type.  There is no implication that these results
would be expected to occur  overnight.  Moreover,  with progressive implementation
--  which  is more  likely  --  the  results  would  also  be progressively  achieved.33
Table  13:  Effects  of changes  in  EC trade  regime  on Hungary,  by SITC  2 Digit
Uruguay  Round  plus  rate  for:
SITC  Description  Imiports  83  GSP  Med.  EF1A  EC  UR  GSP  Med.  EFTA  EC
TOTAL  TRADE  969305  57984.2  96086.4  145062.6  465653.9  81048.7  125070.6  155035.5  187847.9  418054.7
00  LIVE  ANIMALS  4379  348.6  355.0  0.0  1445.3  53.7  334.4  339.6  53.7  1218.2
01  MEAT  & PREPARATIONS  75857  3120.9  2905.2  0.0  55102.6  3320.0  5846.1  5669.3  3320.0 48223.6
02  DAIRY  PRODUCTS  & EGGS  8  0.0  0.0  0.0  6.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  4.9
03  FISH  & PREPARATIONS  3232  32.0  133.5  0.0  503.5  27.9  53.5  135.2  27.9  432.9
04  CEREALS  AND PREPARATIONS  11322  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
05  FRUIT  &  VEGETABLES  48667  5027.5  9473.9  4.5  50659.6  4455.3  8554.8 12191.8  4459.0 46088.4
06  SUGAR,  PREPARATIONS  & HONEY  6930  464.2  4551.6  0.0  10338.3  329.0  710.3  4068.2  329.0  8829.8
07  COFFEE,  TEA,  COCOA,  SPICES  5063  511.6  1092.4  0.0  2286.3  314.5  727.2  1196.0  314.5  2159.1
08  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  10382  29.2  41.5  0.0  8516.5  510.1  534.7  544.9  510.1  7576.2
09  MISC  FOOD  PREPARATIONS  6419  36.0  219.8  152.5  5156.0  473.8  503.0  651.8  597.4  4721.4
11  BEVERAGES  15334  1631.3  2088.5  67.8  12576.9  1511.0  2832.1  3204.0  1567.4 11731.4
21  HIDES,SKINS,  INC.  FUR,  UNDRESSED  1213  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
22  OIL SEEDS,NUTS,KERNELS  14326  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
23  RUBBER  CRUDE,SYNTHETIC  230  4.2  0.0  11.9  11.9  2.9  5.6  2.9  10.6  10.6
24  WOOD,  LUMBER  & CORK  24661  37.8  38.8  98.0  98.0  29.0  53.7  54.4  92.9  92.9
25  PULP  AND  WASTE  PAPER  346  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
26  TEXTILE  FIBRES  (NOT  YARN,  THREAD)  10766  365.9  515.5  1047.7  3940.8  282.2  520.9  618.5  965.5  3862.8
27  CRUDE  FERTILIZERS  & MINERALS  1798  0.3  1.3  2.1  2.1  0.2  0.4  1.1  1.6  1.6
28  METALLIFEROUS  ORES,  METAL  SCRAP  9683  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
29  CRUDE  ANIMAL  VEG  MATERIALS  NES  54373  338.3  341.5  0.0  2526.6  136.8  409.5  412.2  136.8  2172.2
32  COAL,COKE,BRIQUETTES  71  0.1  0.6  3.7  3.7  0.3  0.4  0.7  2.7  2.7
33  PETROLEUM  & PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  43767  3024.2  3242.2  8174.2  8174.2  1680.3  3657.2  3799.5  7022.7  7022.7
34  GAS  NATURAL  AND  MANUFACTURED  11764  235.1  234.8  672.6  672.6  117.7  270.8  270.6  555.7  555.7
41  ANIMAL  OILS & FATS  3436  137.2  136.0  1.5  39,.2  17.7  127.7  126.7  19.0  332.0
42  FIXED  VEGETABLE  OILS & FATS  1926  136.0  107.4  0.0  4569.6  210.2  322.8  299.1  210.2  3988.6
43  PROCESD  ANIMAL, VEG  OIL  & FATS  8  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2
51  CHEMICAL  ELEMENTS  & CONPOUNDS  81702  4206.1  8652.6  11883.0  11913.2  2522.3  5309.7  8260.7  10388.5  10412.7
52  MINERAL  TAR & CRUDE  CHEMICALS  17867  272.8  284.0  790.5  790.5  127.6  305.5  312.8  643.0  643.0
53  DYEING, TANNING  & COLORING  MATRLS  856  147.4  178.6  421.5  421.5  96.6  194.2  214.9  375.8  375.8
54  MEDICINAL  & PHARM  PRODUCTS  6095  780.5  1069.8  2188.1  2201.4  472.1  990.0  1181.6  1922.4  1931.1
55  ESSENTIAL  OILS & PERFUME  MATRLS  1739  112.2  171.6  294.1  294.1  77.1  151.0  190.4  270.8  270.e
56  FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  32895  1896.6  4725.6  11918.4  11918.4  3415.7  4661.0  6506.0  11213.5  11213.5
57  EXPLOSIVES,  PYROTECH  PRODUCTS  277  44.4  68.6  127.1  127.1  35.2  64.3  80.1  118.4  118.4
58  PLASTIC MATERIALS  ETC  8735  1928.2  4267.5  5796.5  5796.5  1578.8  2846.8  4379.5  5385.6  5385.6
59  CHEMICALS  NES  2267  286.6  729.1  815.3  815.8  187.2  376.7  668.8  725 5  725.8
61  LEATHER/FURS  INC MANUFS  7744  609.7  713.7  1727.8  2168.0  484.0  881.4  949.1  1609.9  2050.7
62  RUBBER  MANUFACTURES  10281  1089.6  1763.4  3194.5  3196.5  957.8  1667.7  2106.7  3039.0  3039.0
63  WOOD  IL CORK  MANUFACTURES  11068  940.7  1178.7  2702.1  2702.1  617.4  1233.7  1390.5  2387.2  2387.2
64  PAPER/BOARD  & MANUFACTURES  3125  417.7  452.1  1172.5  1209.0  342.0  615.2  637.8  1108.6  1132.7
65  TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS  & ARTICLES  33921  3668.3  6651.5  10283.6  47674.2  18788.9  23314.8  26994.1  31456.7  31456.7
66  NON-METALLIC  MINERAL  MANUFACTURES  22141  1943.8  3983.0  7088.7  10998.7  1794.7  3068.2  4405.8  6437.0  10364.1
67  1RON  £ STEEL  68360  3270.2  4228.2  12155.7  82250.0  3396.7  5527.8  6152.1 11317.9 81618.8
68  NON-FERROUS  METALS  20595  1055.9  1391.4  3071.8  3071.8  930.7  1622.2  1841.4  2941.3  2941.3
69  METAL ANUFACTURES  NES  17300  1340.3  1829.5  4113.9  4318.0  1085.8  1962.3  2282.4  3775.1  3979.634
71  MACHINES  NON-ELECTRIC  41943  2088.7  3350.3  5948.5  5948.5  1568.4  2933.5  3757.1  5455.7  5455.7 72  MACHINERY  ELECTRIC  65130  4101.3  5292.0  11690.4  18061.3  3Z28.0  5906.3  6684.1  10861.8 17250.9 73  TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  13554.0  1629.9  1676.7  4653.2  4653.Z  1567.4  2627.4  2658.0  4594.7  4594.7 81  SANITARY,PLUMBG,HEATNG,jGHTNG  EQU  5267.6  490.3  914.6  1282.Z  2199.0  405.9  725.3  1001.3  1241.2  2160.8 82  FURNITURE  21624.8  966.4  1808.1  4767.4  16537.7  1522.2  2150.9  2698.5  4623.7 16402.7 83  TRAVEL  GOODS,  HANDBAGS  3065.0  226.1  280.5  643.9  643.9  179.6  326.9  362.4  599.2  599.2 84  CLOTHING  46034.2  5477.3  10004.4  15629.4  40842.6  19047.8 24702.7 29360.8 35180.9 35180.9 85  FOOTWEAR  15788.4  1707.0  2011.6  5531.9  10789.1  1682.0  2796.0  2994.9  5291.4 10561.3 86  PROF.  SCIENTIFIC  ETC INSTRUMENTS 5654.0  384.9  682.9  1072.8  1072.8  269.9  522.0  717.2  972.6  972.6 89  MISC  MANUFACTURES  NES  23739.0  1354.4  2171.1  3669.4  5613.1  1101.5  1985.4  2518.1  3495.9  5380.3
Source:  Estirates  by the  authors. See text  for wthodology.
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VIII. Conclusions
Recent political changes in Eastern Europe will help to cement improving
economic relations Detween those countries and the EC.  They will accelerate a
trend which flows in part from the economic pull of the EC and in part from the
continuing economic difficulties in Eastern Europe.  In our view Hungary has
little alternative but to seek to continue strengthening these ties. The final
integration  of Portugal and Spain in  t:ie  Communities, the unification  of Germany
and the completion of the internal market in 1992 will pcse some challenges for
Hungary.  Moreover, it faces important supply constraints and nee.s injections
of fresh capital to help it gear up to seize market opportunities.
In the past Hungary has  been somewhere  near the bottom of the EC's pyramid
of  privileges as far  as  tariff and  NTB treatment  are concerned, although  this  has
changed modestly with the granting of GSP tariff treatment.  Hungary has been
examining the options of applying  for EC membership,  EFTA mermbership,  and
examining other forms of association such as those the EC has with a number of
Mediterranean  countries. From  a  simulation  exercise,  we conclude  that  membership
of the EC could lead to an expans.on of Hungarian exports to the Communities of
some 48 percent, with meats, iron and steel, fruit and vegetables, textiles,
clothing being the main sectors to gain, in declining order.  This results from
setting  tariffs  to  zero  and eliminating  non-tariff barriers.  The  largest
projected export expansion under other forms of relationship with the EC would
be  more than one third less.  This would occur under EFTA membership which would
mainly benefit  manufactured exports.  If  EC or EFTA membership is ruled  out, for
whatever  reason,  Hungary  must  seek  some  closer  relationship  with  the  EC,
encompassing agriculture as  well as manufactures, and covering tariffs and non-
tariff barriers.36
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ANNEX  I
Annex  Table  Al:  Composition  of EC Export.  to Hungary
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
TOTAL  TRADE  (Smillion)  1,759  1,730  1,890  2,399  2,734  1,819
0 FOOD  AND  LIVE  ANIMALS  4.9  4.3  3.1  3.3  3.0  3.2
1 BEVERAGES  AND  TOBACCO  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.4  0.3
2 CRUDE  MATLS  EXCL  FUELS  5.0  5.1  4.4  4.7  4.2  3.5
3 MINERAL  FUELS  ETC  0.6  1.1  2.5  1.1  0.4  0.3
4 ANIMAL,VEGETABLE  OIL,FAT  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2
5 CHEMICALS  25.0  25.2  22.4  22.7  22.1  19.6
6 BASIC  MANUFACTURES  26.8  25.7  26.1  25.3  25.4  25.2
7 MACHINES,TRANSPORT  EQUIP  27.9  28.1  30.9  31.9  34.1  36.7
8 MISC  MANUFACTURED  GOODS  7.3  7.8  8.0  8.3  8.4  10.4
9 GOODS  NOT  CLASSD  BY KIND  1.5  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  0.6
Source:  COMTRADE
Annex  Table  A2:  Composition  of Hungary's  Imports  from  the  USSR,  1983-1987
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Total  trade  ($million)  2,423  2,354  2,449  2,960  2,805
of which  (percent)
Agricultural  pr.  15.0  14.7  13.0  14.8  14.6
Mineral  fuels  47.0  51.4  53.6  53.9  50.7
Chemicals  6.3  6.9  8.1  7.1  7.3
Machines,trans.equip  22.6  18.7  17.3  16.3  18.8
other  manuf.products  8.9  8.2  7.9  7.9  8.4
Source:  COMTRADE39
Annex  Tabte  A.3:  Batassa  RCA Indices.  1986-87  in  EC-10  Market  Overlsocina
Comparative  Advantage  with  GOR,  Spain  or PortugaL
. ...........  ....................  ..................................  . .
EC-10  87
ImPorts  RCA Indicec  for
SITC  Description  Hungary  Hungary  GDR  Spain  PortugaL
0012  SHEEP,  LAMBS,  GOATS  52435  92.98  1.12  1.08  0.02
0015  HORSES,  ASSES,  MULES  8246  4.89  2.02  0.12  0.05
0019  LIVE  ANIMALS  FR FOOD  NES  1215  14.92  61.48  0.54  0.66
0112  MUTTON  ETC FRSH,CHLD,FRN  4779  2.25  0.00  1.16  0.00
0118  MEAT  NES FRESH,CHLD,FRZN  90674  99.03  2.85  1.09  0.01
0313  SHELL  FISH  FRESH,FROZEN  7303  1.26  0.82  1.24  0.21
0440  MAIZE  UNMILLED  22073  4.61  0.00  1.13  0.00
0451  RYE  UNMILLED  206  1.58  0.07  4.23  0.02
0519  FRESH  FRUIT  NES  8227  1.35  0.00  9.21  0.14
0536  FRUIT  TEMPORARILY  PRESVD  12328  13.44  0.02  3.37  0.36
0539  FRUIT  NUTS  NES  PRESERVED  6274  2.23  0.02  4.24  0.02
0545  OTHER  FRESH  VEGETABLES  18056  2.38  0.00  9.92  0.24
0546  VEGETABLES  SIMPLY  PRESVD  9451  4.20  0.02  1.84  0.76
0551  VEG  DRIED  EXCL  LEGUMES  10838  20.29  0.00  1.64  1.11
0555  VEGTBLES  PRSVD,PREPD  NES  10371  1.93  0.01  3.05  1.49
0751  PEPPER  AND  PIMIENTO  5647  9.11  0.00  2.49  0.07
0752  SPICES,EXCL  PEPPER,ETC  1038  1.89  1.14  2.63  0.02
0913  PIG,POULTRY  FAT  RENDERED  10387  33.91  13.70  0.00  0.00
1121  WINE  OF FRESH  GRAPES  ETC  13536  1.50  0.00  3.92  10.63
2118  WASTE  AND  USED  LEATHER  15  3.93  0.44  1.42  1.74
2218  OIL  SEEDS,NUTS,ETC  NES  26828  5.74  2.22  0.27  0.00
2314  SCRAP  UNHARDENED  RUBBER  875  12.32  21.65  1.23  0.05
2412  WOOD  CHARCOAL  316  3.93  1.06  14.19  15.52
2421  PULPWOOD  3958  6.10  1.20  0.27  5.21
2626  WOOL  SHODDY  512  32.09  0.00  1.06  0.00
2633  COTTON  WASTE  UNCOMBED  1094  4.77  0.78  0.05  2.53
2663  REGENERATD  FIBRE  TO SPIN  2335  2.08  11.29  0.68  0.06
2664  WASTE  OF SYN,RGNRTD  FBRE  3660  12.30  9.03  0.13  0.03
2670  WASTE  OF TEXTILE  FABRICS  1041  2.02  3.55  0.16  0.45
2751  INDUSTRIAL  DIAMONDS  513  1.36  1.88  0.01  0.00
2911  SONES,IVORY,HURNS,ETC  1659  7.12  6.47  0.67  0.22
2919  ANIMAL  MATERIALS  NES  61830  22.78  0.55  0.82  1.51
2923  VEG  PLAITING  MATERIALS  3105  26.50  0.13  1.56  0.28
2924  VEG  USED  IN PHAPMACY  ETC  4673  9.36  0.77  0.47  0.16
2925  SEEDS,ETC  FOR  PLANTING  8270  5.88  5.65  0.22  0.06
2929  OTH CRUDE  VEG  MATERIALS  767  1.00  0.00  2.75  3.14
3321  MOTOR  SPIRIT,GASOLINE  11779  1.01  0.08  1.32  0.62
3322  WHITE  SPIRIT,KEROSENE  3852  2.06  0.00  0.92  1.07
3323  DISTILLATE  FUELS  37835  1.62  2.74  0.15  0.08
3326  MINERAL  JELLY,WAX  12351  25.04  4.28  0.68  0.00
3329  NONCHEM  COAL,PETR  WJASTES  6216  3.12  0.00  1.10  0.00
4217  RAPE,COLZA,MUSTARD  OILS  147  1.02  3.96  0.01  0.00
5121  HYDROCARBONS  ETC  59087  4.24  3.20  1.07  1.66
5127  NITROGEN-FNCTN  COMPOUNDS  11689  1.16  3.05  0.42  0.16
5141  METAL  CMPD  OF INORG  ACID  1154  1.18  4.84  0.99  0.07
5142  CONTINUATION  OF 514.1  3289  1.51  5.08  0.91  0.02
5214  COAL,PETR  DISTILATES  NES  3919  3.89  1.22  3.71  4.43
5413  ANTIBIOTICS  4680  1.87  0.07  0.70  2.27
5414  VEG ALKALOIDS  AND  DERIVS  2126  2.09  0.49  1.11  0.07
5415  HORMONES  1228  1.30  1.29  0.11  0.15
5511  ESSENTIAL  OILS,RESINOIDS  855  1.02  0.51  1.32  0.45
5611  CHEM  NITROGENOUS  FERTLZR  19208  6.38  5.87  0.98  1.75
5711  PREPARED  EXPLOSIVES  561  1.63  1.31  0.47  0.36
5714  HUNTIN,SPORTIN  AMMUNITN  1648  10.20  1.79  0.78  0.06
6119  LEATHER  NES  3638  1.58  2.93  3.63  0.19
6123  PREPD  PARTS  OF FOOTWEAR  23618  12.76  0.05  3.00  13.12
6130  FUR  SKINS  TANNEO,DRESSED  5026  1.59  0.82  12.19  0.55
6291  RUBBER  TYRES,TUBES  15891  1.37  2.95  2.23  0.48
6294  RUBBER  BELTING  1589  2.40  1.11  0.86  0.27
6321  BOXES,CASES,CRATES  332  1.07  0.00  3.96  8.09
6324  BUILDERS  WOODWRK,PREFABS  5892  2.56  0.36  0.83  4.89
6327  WOOD  MFRS,DOMESTIC  ETC  2544  3.29  2.67  2.65  2.97
6328  OTHER  WOOD  MANUFACTURES  13283  11.08  1.94  1.22  1.71
6416  FIBREBOARD  OF WOOD  ETC  3561  3.35  0.01  1.63  2.37
6513  GREY  COTTON  YARN IN  BULK  8256  1.31  0.08  1.33  2.01
6514  COTTON  YARN,BLCHD,DYED  319  1.30  0.14  1.03  1.44
6515  FLAX,RAMIE,TRU  HEMP  YARN  1044  3.93  0.00  2.04  0.32
6522  WOVEN  COTTON  BLCHD,ETC  8749  1.25  0.36  0.47  2.70




Imports  RCA Indices  for
SITC Description  Hungary  Hungary  GDR  Spain  Portugal
6556 CORDAGE  AND  MANUFACTURES  3131  3.92  1.79  0.70  18.46
6561 BAGS,SACKS  OF TEXTILES  1182  2.57  2.33  0.86  6.27
6562 MADE-UP  CANVAS  GOODS  5013  10.58  21.48  0.28  0.15
6569  OTHER  TEXTILE PRODUCTS  10157  2.22  0.78  0.73  26.18
6576 CARPETS  ETC UNKNOTTED  7387  1.40  0.50  0.31  1.34
6577 TAPESTRIES  99  4.70  0.16  0.43  4.78
6578  MATS,SCREENS,ETC  PLAITED  1571  16.42  0.31  4.43  0.02
6612  CEMENT  1945  1.16  10.00  0.70  0.01
6643  DRAWN,BLOWN  GLASS  UNWRKD  5006  21.12  17.91  1.09  0.62
6645  CAST,ROLLED  GLASS  UNWRKD  2177  11.97  5.95  i  84  1.23
6648  SHEET  GLASS  METAL-COATED  1166  1.81  2.33  1.08  0.17
6651  BOTTLES  ETC OF GLASS  6062  2.93  0.88  1.17  2.03
6652  HOUSEHLD,HOTEL  ETC GLASS  8711  3.78  4.51  0.72  1.43
6664  PORCELN,CHINA  HOUSE  WARE  3157  3.02  15.39  0.54  2.44
6665  COARSE  CERAMIC  hOUSEWARE  1121  1.40  3.96  0.77  15.21
6666  CERAMIC  ORNAMENTS  ETC  1521  1.56  5.76  1.85  15.24
6727  IRN,STL COIL FR REROLLNG  18636  2.45  1.14  0.03  0.08
6731  IRON,STEEL  WIRE ROD  4851  1.90  1.31  1.9  1.48
6734  IRN,STL BIG SECTIONS  ETC  15159  4.28  8.59  3.07  0.58
6735  IRN,STL SMALL  SECTNS  ETC  1059  12.81  7.16  1.05  0.32
6741  IRN,STL HEAVY  PLATE ETC  16812  4.29  9.59  1.26  0.03
6742  IRN,STL MEDIUM  PLATE ETC  7673  6.12  2.54  1.18  0.01
6743  IRN,STL THIN UNCOATED  11840  1.16  1.93  1.86  0.03
6782  IRN,STL TUBE  SEAMLES  NES  7448  2.28  4.32  1.26  0.02
6783  IRON,STL TUBE,PIPE NES  8212  1.69  0.30  1.09  0.01
6791  IRON CASTINGS  ROUGH  1305  3.48  4.94  1.89  3.21
6841  ALUMINUM,ALLOYS,  UNWRGHT  11546  1.29  0.09  1.54  0.12
6842  ALUMINUM,ALLOYS  WORKED  24546  2.04  0.62  0.38  0.08
6921  MTL STORAGE,MF  TANKS,ETC  528  1.12  1.61  0.42  0.58
6923  COMPRESSED  GAS CYLINDERS  871  2.44  1.34  0.41  10.09
6941  STL,COPPER  NAILS ETC  1881  3.56  1.85  2.53  0.10
6971 DOMESTC  STOVES,OVENS,ETC  1973  1.71  3.85  3.43  0.22
6972  BASE  MTL DOMESTC  UTENSLS  5831  2.61  4.28  1.25  2.31
7122  HARVESTING  ETC MACHINES  19890  5.19  2.22  0.14  0.02
7172  SKIN,LEATHER  WORKNG  MACH  2422  7.59  0.02  1.24  0.46
7197  BALL,ROLLER,ETC  BEARINGS  8133  1.55  0.96  0.91  1.11
7221  ELECTRIC  POWER  MACHINERY  17047  1.32  4.23  0.88  0.98
7250  DOMESTIC  ELECTRIC  EQUIP  35782  2.21  5.21  1.54  0.20
7292  ELECTRIC  LAMPS,BULBS  30788  9.48  3.84  0.50  0.27
7316  FREIGHT  CARS  NOT  POWERED  574  1.92  4.57  0.23  0.04
8122  CERAMIC  PLUMBNG  FIXTURES  2508  4.45  0.56  2.87  2.65
8124  LIGHTING EQUIPMENT  3091  1.00  4.42  1.76  0.62
8210  FURNITURE  50616  2.15  7.72  1.10  0.59
8310  TRAVEL  GOODS,HANDBAGS  7362  1.81  7.62  0.68  0.15
8411  TEXTILE CLOTHES  NOT  KNIT  199426  4.80  0.26  0.30  5.41
8412  TXTL CLTHG  ACSRY  NONKNIT  22726  9.26  2.54  0.34  1.78
8413  LEATHER  CLOTHES,ACCESRYS  14679  3.16  0.13  0.49  1.06
8414  CLOTHING,ACCESSORYS  KNIT  67364  2.09  0.48  0.50  8.56
8420  FUR  ETC CLOTHES,PROD  12460  7.44  1.49  1.65  0.28
8510  FOOTWEAR  47792  2.47  0.13  3.16  9.99
8921  PRINTED  BOOKS,GLOBES,ETC  8738  1.82  1.78  2.23  0.70
8923  PRINTED,MANUSCRIPT  MUSIC  425  14.88  3.36  0.05  0.00
8943 NON-MILITARY  ARMS  433  1.35  13.63  3.73  2.54
8944 OUTDOOR  SPORT  GOODS  NES  3464  1.31  2.80  0.73  0.73
8945 AMUSEMENTS  ETC FOR  FAIRS  1161  4.95  0.74  1.30  0.03
8992 BROOMS,PLAITED  PROD,ETC  3120  2.79  3.30  1.08  1.20
8993 CANDLES,MATCHES,ETC  1336  1.33  2.18  1.13  3.22
Source:  COMTRADE  and calcuLations  by  the  authors.
Mote:  See Footnote  22  in  main text  for  interpretation  of  the  RCA index.  The item  includes  in  this  table  are
those  for  which  Hungary has  contarative  advantage  (on  RCA>1) and  for  ihich  either  the  GDR, Spain  or
Portugal  has comparative  advantage  (i.e.  one of  these  three  has  an  RCA>1).41
Annex  Table  A4:  EC IMPORTS  FROM  HUNGARY  AFFECTED  BY BROAD  CATEGORIES  OF NTIS  APPLIED  IN  1988
IMPORTS  '84  MTB TYPES
SITC  DESCRIPTION  S '000  PRICE  THREATS  QRS  ALL
ALL  TOTAL  TRADE  3861468  27.7  7.0  26.3  35.2
00  LIVE  ANIMALS  364167  87.3  0.9  84.9  88.3
01  MEAT  & PREPARATIONS  320130  40.3  1.9  11.5  39.7
02  DAIRY  PRODUCTS  & EGGS  5661  99.5  0.0  26.2  89.8
03  FISH  & PREPARATIONS  12303  7.9  0.0  0.0  7.9
04  CEREALS  AND PREPARATIONS  42912  100.0  4.2  98.8  100.0
05  FRUIT  & VEGETABLES  122643  44.0  8.1  21.1  61.5
06  SUGAR,  PREPARATIONS  & HONEY  4563  46.2  0.0  20.9  58.1
07  COFFEE,  TEA,  COCOA,  SPICES  9621  65.5  0.0  12.7  65.5
08  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  63378  19.7  0.0  39.8  39.8
09  MISC  FOOD  PREPARATIONS  87246  98.3  0.1  0.0  85.4
11  BEVERAGES  65259  98.5  0.0  98.8  0.3
12  TOBACCO  & MANUFACTURES  THEREOF  3618  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
21  HIDES,SKINS,  INC.  FUR,  UNDRESSED  8361  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
22  OIL  SEEDS,NUTS,KERNELS  6660  0.0  1.1  9.6  9.6
23  RUBBER  CRUDE,SYNTHETIC  2763  0.0  0.0  6.8  6.8
24  WOOD,  LUMBER  & CORK  137358  0.0  0.0  0.1  O.1
25  PULP  AND  WASTE  PAPER  306  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
26  TEXTILE  FIBERS  (NOT  YARN,  THREAD)  51669  0.4  8.8  10.2  18.9
27  CRUDE  FERTILIZERS  &  MINERALS  92610  3.7  19.9  37.3  40.0
28  METALLIFEROUS  ORES,  METAL  SCRAP  135675  0.0  4.5  0.6  5.2
29  CRUDE  ANIMAL  VEG  MATERIALS  NES  37332  0.2  2.5  21.6  21.9
32  COAL,COKE,BRIQUETTES  423  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
33  PETROLEUM  & PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  321309  0.0  21.6  11.1  32.6
34  GAS  NATURAL  AND  MANUFACTURED  75366  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5
41  ANIMAL  OILS  & FATS  11691  34.4  0.0  3.2  34.4
42  FIXED  VEGETABLE  OILS  & FATS  2637  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
43  PROCESO  ANIMAL,  VEG  OIL  & FATS  621  0.0  0.0  4.2  4.2
51  CHEMICAL  ELEMENTS  &  COMPOUNDS  387792  0.1  0.0  1.1  1.2
52  MINERAL  TAR  & CRUDE  CHEMICALS  99108  0.0  0.0  2.9  2.9
53  DYEING,  TANNING  & COLORING  MATRLS  2160  0.0  0.0  7.3  7.3
54  MEDICINAL  & PHARM  PRODUCTS  19323  0.0  0.5  6.6  7.1
55  ESSENTIAL  OILS  &  PERFUME  MATRLS  2286  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
56  FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  30384  0.0  0.0  11.5  11.5
57  EXPLOSIVES,  PYROTECH  PRODUCTS  2331  0.0  0.0  24.8  24.8
58  PLASTIC  MATERIALS  ETC  20799  0.0  0.0  9.1  9.1
59  CHEMICALS  NES  19080  3.3  0.0  5.3  5.5
61  LEATHER/FURS  INC  MANUFS  20574  0.0  37.3  5.8  43.1
62  RUBBER  MANUFACTURES  22887  0.0  0.0  16.6  16.6
63  WOOD  & CORK  MANUFACTURES  26847  10.5  0.0  7.4  16.7
64  PAPER/BOARD  &  MANUFACTURES  10386  76.9  0.0  10.1  78.6
65  TEXTILE  YARN,  FABRICS  & ARTICLES  97056  85.2  2.0  81.0  96.9
66  NON-METALLIC  MINERAL  MANUFACTURES  58986  10.8  1.2  24.2  32.7
67  IRON  & STEEL  161280  37.3  54.3  60.7  61.4
68  NON-FERROUS  METALS  61407  0.0  0.1  5.7  5.8
69  METAL  MANUFACTURES  NES  44838  0.0  0.7  3.6  4.3
71  MACHINES  NON-ELECTRIC  204147  7.7  2.5  2.2  11.2
72  MACHINERY  ELECTRIC  167283  0.5  3.2  3.8  7.0
73  TRANSPORT  EQUIPMENT  52497  0.0  3.4  4.0  7.4
81  SANITARY,PLUMBG,HEATNG,LGHTNG  EQ.  11961  62.4  7.0  7.0  62.5
82  FURNITURE  39870  0.0  10.1  9.5  19.6
83  TRAVEL  GOODS,  HANDBAGS  3042  0.0  0.0  4.2  4.2
84  CLOTHING  181944  85.9  0.5  90.0  90.2
85  FOOTWEAR  36810  0.0  88.9  51.2  66.7
86  PROF.  SCIENTIFIC  ETC  INSTRUMENTS  29835  0.0  1.6  2.3  3.9
89  MISC  MANUFACTURES  NES  59157  0.0  0.9  2.3  3.2
Source:  See  Annex  IlIl.42
ANNEX  II - THE  SIMULATION  MODEL  & DATA  SOURCES
Reduced form of the model
It is  quite standard  to express the trade creation effect for trade partner (or
exporter)  i,  TCi  (or dMi/Mi),  as  a  function of  original  imports  Mi,  the
elasticity of import demand  (Em),  the export supply elasticity  (Ex) and the
change  in rate  of protection,  t,  for exporter  i thus:
TCi =  Mi*Em*d(t)/(l+t)(1-Em/Ex)
The term d(t) is the  lifference between the rate affecting exporter i after
applying the trade policy change in each simulation scenario.
Trade diversion  (TDi).  At the tariff line level a product coming from one
exporter is considered to be an imperfect substitute for the  "same,  product
coming from  other exporters - the Armington (1969)  assumption.  The elasticity
of substitution  (Es) is the percentage change in the relative import share of
a particular supplier associated  with a one percent  change in  the relative price
of the products offered by that supplier and the rest of the world.  This
elasticity is used to compute the trade diversion effect, i.e. the extent to
which trade is substituted  between a  particular exporter and all  other suppliers
as a  consequence of  shifts in relative prices  associated with differential
movements in tariff rates.
The trade diversion between expcrters is therefore computed by assuming that
relative market shares will be changed  in proportion to the relative price
changes following the trade policy change in the importing country.
The price change (dP/P) for an imported good entering the importing country is
the combined effect of the tariff change and the price effect associated with
increasing  exports where there is limited export supply capacity.  This can be
derived from the definition of Ex:
Ex=(dX/X)/(dP/P)
Moreover, the  equivalence  between imports (M)  from  i and  exports (X)  by i implies
that dX/X is equal to dM/M - the expression for trade creation.  With  some
substitution and re-arrangement of terms the price effect is given as:
dP/P =  dt/(l+t)*(l+(Em/(Ex-Em)))
This can be calculated for each foreign  supplier (exporter). The relative  price
change (RPC) facing any single exporter is his own price change relative to the
price change for all other exporter of the same  products (computed as an import
weighted average).
(It  may be noted that if exporters of the same product have different export
supply elasticities, there will be price effects which will vary from exporter
to exporter, thus causing trade diversion effects.  However, the lack of data
on different exports supply elasticities precluded this option).
The change in relative market share of any individual exporter for an item is
proportionate to the relative  price  change times  the elasticity of substitution.
Thus, the new market relative share (NMS)  of any individual  exporter,i, can be
computed as the market share-  prior to the trade policy change times 1 plus the
relative prince change times the elasticity of substitution:
NMS=(Mi/(EMi-Mi))*(l+(RPC*Es))43
where (EMi-Mi) is the total of imports coming from other exporters.




The basic tariff information is drawn from the GATT Trade and Tariff Study for
1983.  (This  data base is  not  publicly available). This study  contains extensive
information  on  trade and tariff  rates.  Information  on  tariffs include  both most
favored  nation  (MFN)  and  preferential  rates  relevant  for  the  exporter,
particularly GSP.  All rates are expressed in ad valorem terms.  In the GATT
Study "ad  valorem" equivalents have been  estimated for all specific  and combined
rates.
The main rates are as follows:
(a)  MFN rave.  Most-favored nation rate.  This rate is normally applied to all
trading partners unless preferential tariff  treatment is granted.  As  all
countries have now fully implemented their tariff cuts, the Tariff Study shows
the MFN rate in force for the year of the study as well as that introduced
following  the implementation  of  the Tokyo  Round concessions.  This latter  is  the
rate being negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
The  actual  MFN rate  being applied  to  GATT contracting  can  be lower  than the bound
post-Tokyo Round rate as a consequence of further tariff cuts implemented on a
unilateral  basis  (e.g., by  developing  countries  under  World  Bank  lending
programs).
(b)  GSP  rate.  The rate  normally  applicable  to countries  eligible for  preferential
treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences.  There may be limits on
GSP treatment, with a higher rate (normally the MFN rate) being applied to an
exporter, even if the country in question is a GSP beneficiary country.
(c) Other  preferential  rates.  Complicated  rate  structures  exist  as  a
consequence  of  various  preferential  arrangements  other  than  those  under  GSP,  e.g.
under the  EC/EFTA protocol  or EC special  pr#Eerences for  Mediterranean countries
or African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries under the Lome Convention.
(d)  Actual rate.  The rate applicable to the exporter taking into account of
variations in the applied MFN rate and in preferential treatment.
Several factors should be considered with regard to the tariff information.
First, as mentioned before, all  tariffs which are not originally expressed in ad
valorem terms have been converted  into ad valorem equivalents.  The normal
procedure adopted to compute these equivalents is based on tariff revenues and
import values.  However,  both tariff  revenues  and  import  values  can  vary
considerably over time.  Tariffs vary because of the existence of variable
levies  and  other  elemeints  which  adjust  tariffs,  while  import  values  vary
essentially as a consequence of price fluctuations.  Therefore, the ad valorem
equivalents of specific and combined tariffs may vary from year to year even
though there are no changes in the scheduled rates.
Second, GSP preferential treatment is not always fully granted due to partial
tariff line coverage or to other limitations and exclusions.  Imports above
ceilings are dutiable at the MFN rate, In  the present study we have used general
utilization factors from UNCTAD to apportion the share of GSP eligible imports44
receiving GSP  and MFN  treatment.  However, this cou'd  lead to  errors  in
computing the average GSP rate for some sectors.
Third, the  trade-weighted  world rate  may  be underestimated  as  no account is  taken
of general rates (which are normally higher than MFN rates), which are applied
in some  markets to selected non-GATT contracting  parties.  In addition, it  must
be noted that developing countries' and world rates are trade-weighted average
rates and are computed using 1986  trade flows. These weights may have changed
considerably over time in the last  years.
(ii)  Non-tariff barriers
Information  on the ad valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers was taken from
information compiled by Laird and Yeats  (1990a) who compiled estimates from
micro-economic studies see the main text for a discussion.  Laird and Yeats
(1990b) point  out  that the  failure of  early  studies to  include  non-tariff
barriers in the base level of protection when estimating the trade effects of
tariff changes may lead to substantial overestimation of these effects.
(iii) Imports
Trade  figures are drawn  from the information available  in the  trade  tapes
produced by the GATT Trade and Tariff Study.  They are not directly comparable
with data in the SITC classifications  of the United Nations COMTRADE data base,
nor with various national accounting or balance of payments estimates.  In the
GATT series trade  flows are recorded at the point of clearing customs, even
though they may have been imported considerably earlier and held in bond.  In
the case of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, imports are
valued on a free-on-board (f.o.b)  basis, while for all  other developed countries
a cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.)  valuation iB  used.
Elasticities
The import demand elasticity values are based on the work of:
Robert Stern, et. al., Price elasticities in International  Trade, London,
Macmillan, 1975.
William  Cline  et  al.,  Trade  Negotiations  in  the  Tokyo  Round:  A
Quantitative  Assessment,  Washington,  D.C., the  Brookings  Institution,
1978.
Rolf Langhammer, "Problem3 and Effects of a Developing Country's Tariff
Concession Round  on South-South Trade",  Kie. Whorking  Paper, No.  167,
Institute for world Economics, Kiel, February 19l3.
These elasticities  of import  demand should  be  taken as  merely indicative.  First,
these values were estimated some years ago.  The relationship between import
demand and  domestic  price for  particular  product  groups  may have changed  over the
years.  Second,  the literature  used as  a source for  elasticities normally refers
to products defined at a much higher level  of aggregation than the tariff line.
For the simulation exercise, these values of elasticities have been assigned  to
all products belonging to product groups found in the literature,  Of course,
group elasticities may not be valid for specific products falling in certain
groups.45
There is no comprehensive literature  on supply  elasticities, country by country
for all products.  Accordingly, we have assigned tho following valuos for the
purpose of the simulations.
SITC  Ex  Es
0  1.0  -5.0
1  1.0  -5.0
2  1.0  -5.0
3  3.0  -5.0
4  1.0  -5.0
5  3.0  -5.0
6  5.0  -3.0
7  5.0  -1.5
8  5.0  -1.5
9  5.0  -1.546
ANNEX  III - NTB  DATA
The data used to compile information on NTBs Section III(b) come from several
sources.
The  NTB  information  used  in  the  main  statistical  analysis  covers  only
industrialized  countries  and  is  compiled  from  official  sources,  including
national sources  as well as the  documents of international organizations such as
GATT.  The information  on NTBs has  been systematically  encoded in  computer files
at the tariff-line level by UNCTAD and access to the resulting data files has
been m.de available to the World Bank.
The  trade data used in  the  analysis are  recorded  at the  most detailed tariff-line
level,  again on the  basis of national  tariff classifications.  The data for  this
study were  collected by  the  World  Bank  directly  from  national  statistical
offices.
The  main measure of the extent of  use of NTBs  employed in  this paper is the  trade
coverage ratio (TCR),  or percentage of trade with a particular trading partner
or group of trading partners in given sector affected by NTBs.  Like the
trade-weighting  of tariffs, it  has the advantage  that it  gives greater weight to
products and trade partners with higher trade volumes.  However, it has the
disadvantage that these  same trade figures may be depressed because of the
presence of NTBs or tariffs, i.e.  it has an inherent downward bias.  (In the
extreme case, a prohibition would produce a zero trade weight).
The trade coverage ratios are computed using fixed 1984  trade weights.  This is
equivalent to using a fixed "basket of groceries" for the computation of price
movements.  The implication is that changes in the indices can only occur (i)
when a new NTB is imposed or an existing NTB is eliminated, (ii)  when a tariff
line is  affected through the extension of,  or exemption from,  the coverage  of an
existing NTB,  or  (iii) when  an  individual country  is affected  through the
extension of, or exemption from, the scope of an existing NTB.  The trade
coverage ratio does not reflect the intensity  of application of an existing NTB
to  an individual  country  or group of  countries  on a  particular tariff line  or set
of tariff lines.  Thus, a reduction or -xpansion in the size of a quota is not
captured by these measures.
It is important to note that for the calculation of the trade coverage ratios
intra-EC  trade was excluded from the analysis.  The inclusion  of intra-EC  trade
would yield much lower ratios than those shown in the tables.
The  following is a brief glossary of the different types  of NTBs to which
reference is  made in the paper.
Price NTBs
A number of the measures included are strictly speaking tariffs, e.g. seasonal
tariffs, but they depart significantly from  standard  ad valorem tariffs in  their
use and intentions.  It is this non-"pure" tariff facet that has led  to their
inclusion.  The measures include:
(i)  Tariff quotas.  The application  of two tariff rates, the higher rate coming
into  effect when the quantity  or value of imported  goods  exceeds a  predetermined
level.  These may be ad valorem, specific or mixed;
(ii)  Seasonal tariffs.  The application of higher tariff rates at times when
domestic production is taking place;47
(iii)  Variable levies.  Import charges based on the di ference between a value
established or decreed by the authorities in  the importing  country and the value
declared by the importer or exporter).
(iv) Non ad valorem tariffs.  These include ad valorem tariff. with specific
minimum  rates e.g.  based in part on some physical unit  such as  weight or
quantity.  They are also to ensure that imports  do not drop below certain unit
values.
(v)  Anti-dumping/countervailing investigations.
(vi)  Voluntary export price restraints.  These are normally price undertakings
to avoid the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties.
(vii) Product specific taxes.  Discriminatory taxes applied at the frontier,
i.e.  which are not applied to domestic products.
(viii) Minimum prices/reference prices.  Imports below  certain prices may
trigger the imposition of addition duties.
Threats
These measures include:
(i) Non-automatic  authorizations.  These  include  a  variety  of  licensing
procedures  and  discretionary  authorizations.  When  licenses  are  used  to
administer QRs, they are included only as QRs.
(ii) Price surveillance.  The monitoring of import  prices, including of those
products subject to price undertakings.
(iii)  Anti-dumping/countervailing investigations.
QRs
Various  types have been mentioned in the pap2r.  They include
(i)  the main body of quotas, whether, global, country specific, or seasonal;
(ii)  bilateral agreements on textiles and clothing within the framework of the
MFA, as well as textile quotas (including  some other restraints) are those not
applied under the MFA, e.g. against the socialist countries of Eastern Europe;
and
(iii) voluntary  export restraints and orderly marketing  arrangements.  In
principle prohibitions are covered.
All
The heading "All" encompasses all types of NTBs covered by the data base.  In
fact, for the  this is  merely a regrouping  of other measures already mentioned,
viz.  price NTBs, threats and  QRs.  The reason  for this is  that - unlike the case
of other countries covered by the data base - no information is included on
health and safety regulations (including all types of technical standards and
packing regulations) for the EC countries.
The above list of measures gives an indication  of what has been referred to on
the paper.  It may also help to indicate what has not been covered.  No
information has been  included on measures to promote domestic production or48
exports, i.e.  oubsidies  of  all kinds are not covered.  However, many products
whose production  receives support by domestic price support schemes also need
complimentary import  restraining measures which  are covered by  the analysis.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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